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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Soviet Union**

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***International Affairs***

15 JULY 1987

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INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS HEAD ON 'HUMANITARIAN' ISSUES

PM301105 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Apr 87 Morning Edition p 5

[F. Lukyanov interview "recently in Moscow" with Alexander Hay, president of the International Red Cross Committee: "Humanism and Politics Must Be Indivisible"; first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Excerpts] "Mercy on the battlefield"--it was under this slogan that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), composed of Swiss citizens, was founded back in 1863 in Geneva. Its main task is to give humanitarian aid to the victims of armed conflicts on the basis of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

The ICRC has actively cooperated with the Soviet Union for a long time. Alexander Hay, president of the ICRC, who was in Moscow recently at the invitation of the executive committee of the Union of Societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent of the USSR, talked with our IZVESTIYA correspondent.

[Lukyanov] The ICRC combines aid to victims of armed conflicts with humanitarian aid to political prisoners in various parts of the world, is this not so?

[Hay] Yes, in accordance with the ICRC Charter we offer our services to countries where there are definite internal conflicts leading to the arrests of political opponents.

In Latin America the ICRC has given or continues to give aid in one form or another to political prisoners in countries such as Uruguay, Argentina (during the military dictatorship until 1983), Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Colombia; in Africa--primarily the Republic of South Africa; and in Asia--Thailand, the Philippines, Timor, and Malaysia.

The committee's principal condition for giving aid to political prisoners is that it must be possible to visit all the prisoners. Second, our delegate must have the opportunity to meet and talk with political prisoners without witnesses present. And third, our being able to repeat these visits must be guaranteed. Naturally, it is not in our power to demand that governments release their political prisoners. But we can look into the conditions in which they are kept: whether they are subjected to torture, whether their food is satisfactory, and so forth.

The committee frequently has to give multifaceted aid to countries which have suffered from natural disasters and armed conflicts. El Salvador and the Sahel region of Africa, for instance.

[Lukyanov] The expression "humanitarian mobilization" has recently made its appearance in international vocabulary...

[Hay] It is our opinion that many governments still fail to attach proper importance to humanitarian issues. There is clearly a breach between politics and the principles of humanism. In order to prevent a universal catastrophe, humanism and politics must be indivisible. In our talks with the governments of many countries we have always stressed that a solution of humanitarian problems carries a guarantee of a solution of humanitarian problems carries a guarantee of a solution to political problems.

Never before have "humanitarian mobilization" and the introduction of the principles of humanism, justice, and mercy in international relations been so relevant as now, in our nuclear age. [Hay ends]

A qualitative turn toward today's urgent problems is how members of the ICRC describe its current activity. Understanding of the new realities and the evolution of a new way of thinking and a humanitarian approach to current problems, together with the struggle against the nuclear threat, which is so strongly urged by the Soviet Union, are consonant with the attitudes of progressive society throughout the world. In these conditions, the idea of holding an international conference on humanitarian issues, which was recently put forward by the Soviet government, becomes particularly relevant.

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NAJIBULLAH ON PROGRESS OF RECONCILIATION PROGRAM

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 4, Apr 87 (signed to press 24 May 87) pp 12-15

[Interview with PDPA Central Committee General Secretary Najib by correspondent in Kabul I. Burtsev: "The Revolution Continues"; date of interview not given]

[Text] [Burtsev] Comrade Najib, the 9th year of the building of a new society on Afghan soil has been rich in the many important events in the life of the party and people of your country. In your opinion which of these is the most noteworthy?

[Najib] I would call the restructuring which we have begun to carry out in our party and public life the most important characteristic feature of this year. At the 19th PDPA Central Committee Plenum we attentively discussed questions associated with the realization of the tasks of the national democratic revolution. While on the whole confirming the continuity of PDPA policy, at this plenum we openly admitted our own shortcomings for the first time -- such as the gulf between word and deed, slack discipline, underestimation of the real state of affairs in our approach to the specific phenomena of life, and the poor level of criticism and self-criticism. We condemned the situation within the party whereby many words were employed to praise our achievements in both Dari and Pashto but, when the time came to speak about failures, many literally lost the ability to speak. The plenum focused attention on the necessity of moving from words to deeds, strengthening revolutionary discipline, and rigorously implementing the decisions made.

Certain changes took place in the composition of the leading cadres both during and after the 19th plenum. Thus, the PDPA Central Committee more than doubled in strength -- basically by means of the provincial activists, which broadened the democratic foundations of the party's leadership. The leading personnel of a number of ministries were renewed.

These measures were not slow to have an effect on the country's economy. You know that the Afghan year 1365 (it began 21 March 1986) -- is the first year of the first 5-year plan since the revolution. In accordance with the Basic Guidelines for the DRA's Economic and Social Development in 1365-1369, by the



end of the 5-year plan the volume of national revenue is to increase by 38 percent, and the production of gross agricultural output by 14-16 percent.

We now know that the plan for the first year of the 5-year plan has been successfully fulfilled in practically all sectors of industry and in transportation and trade. Despite the difficulties generated by the undeclared war against the DRA, according to a preliminary assessment GNP will exceed the prerevolutionary level and will approach 200 billion afghanis. We are still experiencing difficulties in agriculture. Naturally, one of the main causes of this is the complex military and political situation in the country. By no means everywhere yet can the peasants plow, sow, harvest their crops, and sell the fruits of their labor in peace.

And of course, the process of national reconciliation now under way is the main event of the 9th year of the revolution and a result of the restructuring.

[Burtsev] The policy of national reconciliation proclaimed and being implemented by the PDPA is a policy of compromise with the opposition forces. What brought about this compromise?

[Najib] The April Revolution in our country was a natural phenomenon caused by objective necessity. Previous regimes were not in a position to resolve the economic, political, and social problems facing the country. Nor did the Daoud regime do anything to eliminate the political and economic crisis. In this situation it was precisely our party which was the only one capable of assuming full responsibility for the country's future. The 1978 revolution was carried out by the people and for the people. But errors and differences within the party during the first 18 months following the revolution and an overestimation by the PDPA leadership of the capacity of broad sectors of society to accept completely the new way of life led to the alienation of the revolutionary vanguard from the people's masses. Subsequently, when the healthy nucleus in the party gained the upper hand and began to rectify the situation, the mistaken actions of its former leaders were exploited by extremist counterrevolutionary circles with the support of their foreign and overseas patrons. A real but undeclared war was unleashed against the DRA.

You know that the imperialist states led by the United States and also the regional reaction supplied and are supplying the counterrevolutionaries with money and the latest weapons. In such a situation the process of consolidating the people's power and carrying out progressive transformations in Afghanistan has been dragged out over many years.

[Burtsev] How do you assess the damage inflicted by the war?

[Najib] There are several ways of measuring this damage. Primarily I mean the direct economic damage, that is, the cost of what has been blown up, burned, and destroyed. Many hundreds of schools have been destroyed, the activities of economic establishments have been paralyzed, and the agricultural production has fallen sharply. Such damage exceeds 50 billion afghanis. But specialists are in a position to calculate, let us say, the indirect economic damage also, that is, the cost of what we could have built,



done, and acquired if there was no war. This exceeds the direct damage several times over. Only the USSR's economic aid and our collaboration with that country have enabled us to achieve the prerevolutionary level of industrial production and accomplish many social tasks such as the development of public health care, housing construction, and ensuring a reasonable standard of living for the population.

Finally there is the main, human loss -- thousands of dead, wounded, and war-maimed Afghans, thousands of shattered families, thousands of our compatriots obliged to drag out a miserable existence in a foreign country. The damage caused by this war is tremendous and our greatest wish is to escape from it.

We are not the perpetrators of this continuing bloodshed. Furthermore we have been trying for a long time to find a way to a political solution of the question, bearing in mind both domestic and foreign policy. You know that our Geneva talks with the Pakistani regime through a representative of the UN general secretary have already lasted nearly 4 years. But our moves toward the opposition both within the country and outside its borders have until recently met with few results. In this situation we have chosen the path of national reconciliation as the chief method of a political solution of the question around Afghanistan.

[Burtsev] Did the world situation influence this choice in any way?

[Najib] Indisputably the contemporary global situation, whereby any local conflict is fraught with the danger of sparking a world thermonuclear conflagration, also had an influence on our choice.

The USSR's efforts to implement its proposals for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the 20th century, as expounded in M.S. Gorbachev's statement of 15 January last year, are understandable in this context. We support the USSR's peace-loving foreign policy initiatives. The new political thinking, the philosophy of peace and compromise -- this is the main artery for mankind's development. The times compel us to seek and find alternative forms of revolutionary struggle, to turn to nonviolent methods. Such methods also conform to the principles of the well known Delhi declaration signed by M.S. Gorbachev and R. Gandhi.

Thus we arrived at a policy of reconciliation from considerations of humanity and common sense, and not from weakness. In making this decision we expected our adversaries to also show good sense and not spurn the hand offered them.

[Burtsev] What preceded the declaration of the policy of national reconciliation?

[Najib] As I have already said, the process of reconciliation has become a very important phenomenon with which the 9th year of the revolution is coming to a close. We have worked on this for a long time. Calls for reconciliation have also been previously heard from the PDPA and the Revolutionary Council and DRA Government.

Over the last year our positions have been consolidated. After the 16th plenum of the party's Central Committee the social base of the revolutionary power became wider. The 5-year plan for the country's economic and social development was adopted and began to be implemented. We became stronger, and strength generates wisdom. We see the longer term. Hence, therefore, we do not want vain sacrifices. We understand very well that this war is by no means a civil war but has been imposed on our people from outside. And we have done and are doing everything so that our compatriots can be united against this futile bloodshed.

The withdrawal from our country's territory during the latter half of last October of six regiments of the limited contingent of Soviet troops was one of the most important specific steps in this direction. By this move, carried out in coordination with the Soviet leadership, we counted on generating a positive reaction on the part of neighboring countries, and also of those Western powers which are supporting and directing the counterrevolution. Such a step could also have a favorable impact on the outcome of the Geneva talks between representatives of the DRA and Pakistan. Unfortunately there has not as yet been an adequate reaction to our initiative.

The 20th PDPA Central Committee Plenum held 20 November last year was another important step in the search for ways of reconciliation. There we attentively analyzed the results of the implementation of the decisions of the 16th plenum aimed at widening the social basis of the revolution, outlined new measures to widen the representation of all strata of the population in local organs of power, and came to the conclusion that we could come forward with a set of new reconciliation initiatives.

Finally, at the 30-31 December extraordinary plenum of the party's Central Committee we discussed and submitted the well defined concept of and comprehensive program for national reconciliation. We gave everyone present the opportunity to express an opinion on this important question before coming to definite decisions.

After the plenum the republic's Revolutionary Council met 3 January this year. It approved the reconciliation program and proclaimed it in its own declaration. A session of the Supreme Extraordinary Commission on National Reconciliation in Afghanistan appointed by the Revolutionary Council took place the same day; 297 representatives of various DRA social forces participated in it.

The cited measures also defined our program for national reconciliation in the country.

[Burtsev] How do you assess the position of the Soviet leadership in relations to this program?

[Najib] My conversations with M.S. Gorbachev during our delegation's visit to Moscow in December 1986 revealed a coincidence of views on all positions. We set out our viewpoint and our policy of national reconciliation and we met with complete understanding and support.

[Burtsev] What is the essence of your initiatives on national reconciliation?

[Najib] It is above all necessary to say that we are ready for reconciliation with everyone who stands on a patriotic platform and who is for a free, democratic, independent and nonaligned Afghanistan. With whom will we not accept reconciliation? Naturally, with those who continue the fratricidal war and the banditry.

As far as specific steps are concerned, they are grounded in the Revolutionary Council's declaration. That is, a cease-fire on the government side from 15 January; the return of the refugees and their provision with all essentials, including housing and work; the creation of coalition organs of power, from the villages up to the republic's supreme organs; the withdrawal of the contingent of Soviet troops on condition of guaranteed nonintervention in our country's affairs from external sources and the nonrenewal of aggression; the participation of private capital in the country's economy; the drafting and adoption of a DRA Constitution; an amnesty for some categories of detainees; and so on.

[Burtsev] How did the reconciliation process begin and how do you rate its progress?

[Najib] The implementation of the policy of national reconciliation began 15 January with the government cease-fire. This cease-fire will last 6 months. If the principal opposition forces join in by 15 July then it will develop into a nationwide peace.

At the same time extraordinary reconciliation commissions were set up in the provinces, districts, cities and villages. Representatives from our side and the opposition sat on them. The commissions were entrusted with wide powers to resolve all questions arising, right up to land distribution, the release of detainees, and organizing local defense detachments. The task of these commissions includes talks with various armed groupings, holding peace councils (jirgas), and setting up coalition organs of local administration. Hundreds of such commissions were set up at all levels in the first few days, and rich experience of their work has already been accumulated.

The Revolutionary Council declared an amnesty for those detainees who pledged not to wage armed struggle against the DRA. In all around 5,000 people were released from prison.

We have established under the Council of Ministers an administration for refugee affairs, headed by Minister Hasan Sharq. It deals with refugee reception and accommodation and provides them with essentials.

The reconciliation policy provides for economic measures. In industry we are creating conditions for the functioning of private and mixed enterprises. Work is resuming at 40 such enterprises which have been closed since the revolution, and nearly 100 new ones are being set up. We are finishing the drafting of legislative acts in the sphere of land ownership and land tenure. Their purpose is to significantly increase the volume of private land ownership, but on condition that the owner can organize the cultivation of the

land and pay the state a progressive tax depending on the size of the holding. It is permitted to hire a work force. In 1986 we drew up a draft DRA Constitution; however, we halted its adoption in connection with the beginning of the reconciliation process, in order to give our partners the opportunity of participating in the discussion of the country's fundamental law and to take their proposals into consideration in the final version. It is envisaged enshrining in the Constitution, in its second point, that Islam is the state religion of the DRA.

And of course, the reconciliation policy envisages the gradual return home of all Soviet forces, commensurately with the cessation of external intervention in Afghanistan's affairs and guarantees of its nonrenewal.

[Burtsev] What is the reaction to your initiative in your country and abroad?

[Najib] I can say that the reconciliation policy has met with an ardent response in Afghan hearts. The people have met our initiatives with great enthusiasm. They have also generated hope among the refugee masses.

But the reconciliation policy has not been to the taste of the U.S. Administration. It reacted to our initiative by increasing pressure on the Pakistani regime with the aim of preventing the positive development of relations between our two countries. Washington has also supported extremist groupings of the DRA's enemies -- the leaders of the so-called "seven," based in Peshawar. As has become known, recently the White House considered the question of the airborne delivery of new consignments of modern weapons, including 100 Stinger rockets, deep inside Afghan territory.

[Burtsev] It is well known that spokesman for the extremist circles of the Afghan counterrevolution gathered in Peshawar rejected outright the DRA proposal for a cease-fire, using as a pretext the presence of the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

[Najib] I think our initiative took them unawares and they simply did not know how to react to it. I want to note that Gulbuddin, one of the extremist leaders, whom I know through university, settled in Pakistan even before the revolution, and he was soon followed by Rabbani and Ahmed Shah Masoud. They began to fight against their own people long before the Soviet troops' appearance here at the request of the DRA Government.

We have already said many times that the limited contingent of Soviet troops came to our country precisely for the purpose of defending the Afghan people from external aggression.

And we declared and are still declaring that we will create the conditions for the Soviet troops' return home. As soon as we achieve peace the Soviet soldier-internationalists will return home. We are already strong enough. Initially the strength of the sarandoy (people's militia) totaled only approximately 8,000 men, the army -- around 50,000, and the security organs -- 7,000. Now their numbers have been increased considerably.



Nevertheless we are ready to share power with those who will cooperate with us. We are prepared to do this because we do not wish to continue the fratricidal war. Because of it life for our people is becoming worse and more and more women are clad in mourning.

But as I have already said, the leaders of the seven counterrevolutionary groupings have close links with Washington and are rejecting our peace-loving proposals. Moreover, they have tried to step up their actions against the DRA. Within the first month following our announcement of the national reconciliation policy they bombarded our positions and populated localities more than 500 times, employing rockets, artillery, and mortars. This is considerably more than for the corresponding period last year. However, even the ranks of the counterrevolution are showing signs of a disarray caused by the mood of the broad masses of Afghan refugees who have hailed the end of the bloodshed. Despite the obstacles erected by the Pakistani and Iranian authorities, approximately 3,700 families have returned home in a single month -- a total of 17,500 people. A number of prominent figures among Afghan emigres in the United States have declared their support for the reconciliation program. Despite orders from Peshawar, many armed groups have joined the reconciliation process. In 1 month alone more than 10,000 men laid down their arms.

Thus it should be noted that a process of polarization of forces is occurring within the ranks of the counterrevolution. Not so long ago I met some former dushmans. Many of them condemned the extremist leaders who prefer not to risk their own lives but instead send hundreds of deluded men to their death. The time will come when these people will also understand where the truth is. We are convinced that, ultimately, the opponents of reconciliation will be isolated.

[Burtsev] And a last question: What would you like to wish our readers in the Soviet Union and abroad, especially in the countries of Asia and Africa?

[Najib] I wish the Soviet people success in the restructuring of social, political, and economic life now underway in the USSR, along with prosperity and a peaceful sky over their heads. For your foreign readers I wish happiness, peace and prosperity. I particularly want to wish the Palestinians the speediest recovery of their homeland; the Iraqis and the Iranians -- an end to the war; the Indians -- peaceful development; Lebanon and Chad -- national reconciliation; the indigenous population of South Africa -- the granting of human rights; and, for all Afro-Asian peoples, peace and prosperity.

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SINHALESE-TAMIL CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA DISCUSSED

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 4, Apr 87 pp 20-22

[Article by Yu. Kuznetsov: "Sri Lanka: A Dangerous Tension"]

[Excerpts] The conflict that erupted over three years ago in Sri Lanka ago between the Sinhalese and the Tamils--the two principal ethnic groups inhabiting the island--continues to rock the country. Reports of the intercommunal clashes, terrorist acts, sabotage and disorder occurring here have become customary. The conflict is ailing the republic, causing anxiety among its neighbors and creating dangerous tension in the region.

The national movement that arose at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries united both the Sinhalese and the Tamils. The ascent of the national-liberation struggle of the Sri Lankans after the Second World War forced the mother country to grant the country dominion status in 1949. It would seem that the time had come for the joint efforts of both ethnic groups to reinforce the independence of their state, develop the national economy and resolve social issues in the interests of all the people. The contradictions between the Sinhalese and the Tamil representatives of the bourgeoisie, however, began to be manifested more and more openly.

In 1956 the supreme legislative organ--the National State Assembly--adopted a law according to which Sinhalese was declared the official language of the country. This and a number of other resolutions of the government were received poorly by the Sri Lankan Tamils, who felt that the national dignity of their community had been diminished in that manner, and the opinion began to spread among the influential political figures that the Tamils were being reduced to the status of a dependent minority (according to 1976 data, the Tamils were 22 percent of the country, while the Sinhalese were about 70 percent). The dissatisfaction of the Tamils, inflamed by certain circles with a vested interest in the destabilization of Sri Lankan society, led to the rise of a Tamil separatist movement.

The growth in the dissatisfaction of the Tamils and the unwillingness and inability of the ruling Sinhalese bourgeoisie to settle the national quarrels engendered a whole series of intercommunal clashes. The country began to suffer strikes, disobedience campaigns and, here and there, armed skirmishes. The most soberly thinking Tamil political figures, over the course of the last

three decades, have striven to find compromise solutions to settle the intercommunal problems. Their efforts, however, have not met with understanding on the part of nationalistically inclined Sinhalese politicians.

Gradually all of the schools in Sri Lanka where instruction was carried out in English were closed, and the remaining educational institutions were divided into Sinhalese and Tamil. The university reform of the 1970s created additional difficulties for the Tamils to enter institutions of higher learning. Tamil secondary-school graduates had to be tested in a greater number of disciplines than the Sinhalese. At the same time, the requirements for Tamils intending to enter state service were stiffened. This sort of government measures forced some Tamils to leave their homeland. For the rest, the opportunity of obtaining an education and work gradually but steadily declined.

It was namely during this period that the trend of the Sri Lankan Tamils toward separatism began to manifest itself openly, appearing in their aspiration to create their own separate state of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka. The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) became the exponent of this idea. The Tamil youth, who saw no positive prospects within the framework of existing legislation, became more and more agitated. Extremist youth organizations that chose methods of terror and violence in the struggle for the creation of a separate state began to appear. One of the most notable of these organizations became the military-type Tigers of Freedom group (at the initial stages of its existence, it was a youth wing of the TULF, but it operates independently today). It is headed by the young Tamil Vilupillay Prabakaran, who possesses exceptional organizational abilities.

In the middle of the 1970s, armed clashes, terrorist acts and sabotage were still rare. The greater portion of the Tamil community hoped that the conflict in the country would be resolved through political means. These hopes, it seems, acquired features of reality during the parliamentary elections of 1977, when the TULF received all 14 mandates in the Northern Province and 4 out of 12 in the Eastern, which permitted this party to take 18 of the 168 seats in parliament and to demand from its rostrum the granting of a certain autonomy to the Tamils that would permit them to solve independently questions of education, internal organization and economics in the regions where they made up the basis of the population.

At that time, the activity of extremist Tamil organizations, each of which was to a greater or lesser extent in favor of the creation of the state of Tamil Eelam, became more active and grew in number. The latter was especially noticeable for the aforementioned Tigers of Freedom, the ranks of which were expanded through the Tamil youth that were unable to find work after completing their education. The ceaseless terrorist acts of the Tigers increased tension in the country, which in the end led to mass bloodshed at the end of July and beginning of August in 1983.

The cause for the massacre of the Tamils was an attack of Tiger fighters on a Sinhalese military patrol near the city of Jaffna that occurred on July 23. Some 13 soldiers were killed as a result of this skirmish. The next day, the bodies of the dead were delivered to Colombo. Their funerals spilled over



into a Tamil pogrom. The slaughter was especially cruel in Colombo and its environs, where quite a few Sri Lankan Tamils reside. Many Tamils were killed or seriously injured.

A consequence of these bloody events, earlier unknown in Sri Lanka, was a massive flight of Tamils from the south to the north, as well as to neighboring India, and principally to its southern state of Tamil Nadu. The number of refugees reached roughly 10,000.

The country once again began to suffer, and wave after wave of terrorist acts, sabotage and murder occurred. At this time, the Communist Party of Sri Lanka (CPSL) and other progressive organizations of the country repeatedly pointed out the inconsistent nature of the domestic policies of the government, which aggravated the already difficult socio-economic situation of the Sri Lankan workers and had a negative effect on the foreign policies of the state, actually dislodging Sri Lanka from the positions of non-alignment.

In uncovering the causes of the Sinhalese-Tamil clashes, CPSL General Secretary K.P. Silva emphasized that the government of the United National Party (UNP) bears direct responsibility for the situation that has led to the ethnic conflict. The communists of Sri Lanka have constantly pointed out the necessity of holding a serious and well prepared political dialogue with all of the interested parties and with the participation of all of the interested political parties of the country so as to find specific and universal ways of solving the problems of the Sri Lankan Tamils and achieving their equality with the Sinhalese in deed, not in word alone. A special resolution adopted at the 12th CPSL Congress emphasized that the Communist Party of Sri Lanka considers the Sinhalese-Tamil clashes a component of the general offensive for the democratic rights of the workers and all forms of opposition to the government.

The position of the communists and the other progressive organizations of Sri Lanka have not been met with understanding by the UNP government. The clashes between the armed groups of Tamils and government troops have become more and more frequent, which has led to the imposition of a state of emergency and the limitation of a number of civil rights. Sinhalese colonists have begun to resettle in the Eastern Province, engulfed by upheavals, where the Tamils make up a considerable percentage of the population. Tens of thousands of people of Tamil nationality have left the country, resettling in southern India. Naturally, such a massive exodus of Tamils has provoked alarm in the Indian government, which has encountered the problem of accommodating the refugees, the spending for which, according to the data of the Indian press, is several million rupees a year. India cannot have an indifferent attitude toward the events taking place on the island that is separated from them by the narrow Palk Strait. It has applied considerable effort so that the participants in the conflict meet at the negotiating table, in the course of which both communities would be able to resolve common national problems peacefully.

Nonetheless, in February of 1986 the Sri Lankan government decided to begin a massive offensive against the Tamil insurgent groups. Military helicopters were sent into the northern regions of the island to smash the strong points

of the insurgents from the air. Many peaceful civilians were killed and hundreds of homes were destroyed as a result of the bombing.

The wave of terror and armed clashes rose up with new force in the country, costing hundreds of human lives. At the beginning of May 1986, a bomb went off in an aircraft of the Air Lanka Company at the Colombo International Airport. Some 16 people perished and 20 were seriously injured. Four days after this incident, another explosion occurred in the capital--this time at the central telegraph office. About 20 people were killed and over 100 were injured. Government circles attempted to place the blame for the terrorist acts on the Tamil separatist organizations, although the latter denied participation in them. At the end of May, explosions blasted at the railroad station near Colombo and in its center.

Mass dismissals of Tamils from institutions and companies belonging to Sinhalese began in response. They even got rid of those who had in no way tarnished their reputations in long years of service. Additional features of the fact that the gulf between the two communities is growing are seen even by Tamils loyally inclined toward the government in the wholesale dismissals and an increase in tensions engendered by the extremists.

A number of political figures in Sri Lanka also see a cause of the deepening intercommunal contradictions in the government program of agricultural development for the country, one of the points of which is the resettlement of Sinhalese into the regions where Tamils have traditionally resided, which provokes the active resistance of the latter. During the Sinhalese religious holiday of Vesak, for example, which is widely observed across the whole country at the beginning of summer, armed Tamils attacked a village near the city of Siripur, where Sinhalese peasants had recently been established. More than 20 of the settlers fell at the hands of the pogrom, several dozen received serious injuries and their homes were burned.

At almost the same time, government aircraft bombed the administrative center of the Northern Province--the city of Jaffna. Several hundred people, including children, women and old people, perished and the trade center, bus station and city hospital building were destroyed.

The bloody feuds between the Sinhalese and the Tamils has cost the country dearly in a literal sense as well. Whereas in 1983 the military spending of Sri Lanka totaled 66 million dollars, in the first half of 1986 alone almost 325 million dollars have been spent for this purpose. Nonetheless, until very recently information about the armed skirmishes that have occurred in the country, even though the battles in the north and east, for example, have involved more than a thousand army servicemen and officials of the security service, has rarely filtered through into the mass media.

The events taking place in Sri Lanka in recent years evoke serious apprehension among its neighbors and first of all, as noted above, India, where the flow of Tamil refugees has chiefly surged. India has called upon Sri Lankan political figures to resolve the conflict between the national groups on the island as quickly as possible, as well as to halt the bloodshed immediately.

As for the democratic forces in Sri Lanka itself, they well understand how important and essential a reliable settlement to the crisis among the nationalities is, the roots of which undoubtedly issue from the colonial past. The mass democratic organizations of the country, the trade unions, the Sri Lankan communists and the progressively minded youth are actively in favor of settling the ethnic conflict. Calls for the development of an effective nationwide campaign against intercommunal hostility, religious obscurantism and schismatic groupings are being heard ever more loudly in the country. It will be difficult for Sri Lanka to settle its burdensome socio-economic problems without a just solution to the nationality question. That is namely why the struggle for a democratic and just settlement of the relations between nationalities is a struggle for the future of a genuinely independent, peace-loving and economically and culturally developed Sri Lanka and a struggle for peace and stability in southern Asia.

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ECONOMIC, SOCIAL EFFECTS OF DRUG TRADE IN PAKISTAN ASSESSED

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 4, Apr 87 pp 25-28

[Article by Candidate of Economic Sciences I. Zhmuyda and V. Ovlev under the rubric "Countries - People - Time": "Narcotics--Tragedy and Business"]

[Excerpts] "A Heroin Boom"

It began in the 1980s. Opium poppy was legal to cultivate under official licensing in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) until 1979. The whole harvest was sent to the state opium factory in Lahore, where it was refined into medicinal preparations. Illegal poppy--and in a considerably greater quantity than legal poppy--was also produced on the territory of the province and in the adjoining settlement zone of the eastern Pushtu tribes, where the powers were never the complete masters of the situation. The production of poppy was up to a certain time limited, however, especially in view of the difficulty of illegally shipping the relatively large-volume and heavy freight--just the raw material for the manufacture of modern narcotics.

Since 1979, the cultivation of poppy has been completely banned in the administratively controlled regions of the NWFP. According to official estimates, the planting of it declined at first in the tribal areas as well. But then the situation changed abruptly.

In order to understand why this occurred, it is necessary to recall certain facts. Opium poppy and other crops containing narcotic substances have been known to mankind since time immemorial. Morphine--a preparation obtained from the refining of poppy--was created in England at the beginning of the 19th century. In the middle of the last century it began to be administered to the sick via injections. In 1880 a more refined product of opium processing appeared--heroin--and was openly sold for a time by the German pharmaceutical firm of Bayer. Hundreds of thousands of addicts that needed it appeared within 10 years, however, in the countries of Europe and America. The production and distribution of heroin became the business of underground syndicates.

A far-flung network of producers and dealers in narcotics, including heroin, was solidly enmeshed in such countries of the Near East as Iran and Afghanistan after the Second World War. There were especially many consumers



of narcotics in Iran under the shah. A number of regions of Afghanistan served at that time as the chief supplier of opium poppy to the Iranian market.

The coming to power of the Islamic fundamentalists in Iran and the April Revolution in Afghanistan to a considerable extent deprived the bosses of the illegal business of both of their spheres--production and sales. That is when the role of the Pushtu settlement zone, poorly controlled by the authorities in Pakistan, increased for them.

In order to ease the export of the narcotics, they "threw in" for the mountain dwellers the "secret" of refining poppy into heroin. A kilogram of heroin is obtained from 10-15 kilograms of poppy, depending on the quality of the raw material. No one, however, verifies the purity of the powder. The main task is to "shrink" the contraband and make it light and convenient to transport.

The settlement zone of the tribes was soon transformed into a gold mine for the heroin mafia. The prices for poppy remained the cheapest in the world, while for the peasants they were unusually high. The farms of a considerable number of the mountain-village dwellers came to be "tied" to the criminal business.

They first tried to ship the contraband manufactured in the settlement zone to Iran using the former routes, but they encountered the determined resistance of the powers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. A roundabout way was then selected--through the Pakistani province of Baluchistan. Although some portion of the forbidden freight continues to follow this routing, as testified to by the victorious communiques on the actions of the border and customs services and the casualties they are currently suffering in the war with the contraband, the main flow of the heroin is concentrated on maritime and air portals of the country in its largest city of Karachi. It is namely principally from there that the heroin begins its path to the countries of Western Europe and North America. Although other for it routings exist, they are all of considerable length and are unreliable. Moreover, the risk of air and maritime shipping from Karachi is also great, and this increases the overhead for ocean transport and correspondingly decreases the value of heroin on the domestic market.

#### Flammable Material for Cities

The social preconditions for the "heroin boom" lie, as they say, on the surface. This is the concentration in the cities of Pakistan, and chiefly the largest ones, of an enormous body of unemployed and half-educated people, ailing and poverty-stricken, huddling together in hovels and without a roof over their heads at all. It must be noted that in the middle of the 1970s, the territorial mobility of the Pakistani population has grown appreciably.

The increasing need of the Persian Gulf countries for foreign manpower has served as an impetus to this. When they had at their disposal an increased share of the export of their now expensive oil in 1973-1974, as is well known the construction of various facilities began and the spheres of trade and financial and social services expanded. Skilled and unskilled workers,

engineers and other specialists streamed from Pakistan to the new "El Dorado," at first timidly and then more and more determinedly.

The emigration of labor resources, which reached a peak at the beginning of the 1980s (roughly 1.5 million people--almost five percent of the manpower), laid bare the scale of the relative resettlement, hidden during the times of inefficient and low-income production. A heavenly fate did not await the emigrants abroad. The Pakistanis encountered difficult living conditions and cruel and sometimes simply inhuman exploitation in the "fraternal" Muslim countries. The only thing keeping back the majority of them were wages that were ten times or more higher than pay for labor of the same skill level in their homeland.

The foreign migration, which was seemingly a continuation of the internal rural-to-urban one, became a catalyst for the latter. A vacuum formed on the urban labor markets, and rural residents were drawn there, both temporarily, during the agricultural off season, and with the hope of finding permanent wages. The worker reserve began to grow faster and faster in the cities, especially through the youth, and the hovel and shack quarters expanded.

Emigrants from other countries, and first of all from Bangladesh, where the situation on the labor market was even worse, supplemented the influx of internal migration, the "newly arrived" masses of rural people to the cities.

An exceptionally large amount of flammable material of human disorder and poor welfare accumulated in Karachi and Lahore. Both cities--with populations in the millions (the former, according to estimates, of over seven million, and the latter, more than three million)--are major gateways to the outside world. The role of the former is especially great in this regard. Karachi is well known for its historically extant cosmopolitanism and the heterogeneity of its national and ethnic population. All of this makes the social problems of the city more acute and leads to the creation of an especially favorable environment for the sale of narcotic poisons.

#### A Tragedy of Thousands

According to official data, Pakistan had only two addicts needing heroin in 1981. Three years later, in 1984, their number had increased to 300,000, and by 1986 the number had crossed 500,000. These figures were obtained as a result of special research, from which it becomes clear that in Pakistan today an average of one family out of eleven encounters the problem of drug addiction. The number undergoing treatment has increased sharply. The Lahore Mayo Hospital alone is visited by over two thousand addicts. The principal portion of the heroin consumers and those who have become seriously ill for this reason are young people from 18 to 25 years old. Passion for the poison has also increased among adolescents. Several young addicts were expelled from school.

Two groups are singled out among the users of heroin. One consists of those without skills or savings, those making ends meet with occasional wages and the traditional representatives of the urban dregs--tramps, professional indigents and "bribers," souteneurs and prostitutes, thieves and petty

speculators. The other group is constituted of better off and chiefly young people who are attending secondary schools and colleges, candidates for office jobs and workers that have been fired from factories and plants.

#### To Please the United States

The growth of heroin users in Pakistan (over 200,000 drug addicts were found in Karachi alone, along with 180,000 in Lahore) is, so to speak, the internal aspect of the problem. There is also an external one, and it troubles the Pakistani authorities to the greatest extent. The "heroin kings," the mafia, active on a worldwide scale, are striving to extract the poison grown in the tribal settlement zone from Pakistan in any way possible. The "white plague," emerging like a genie from the bottle, extends across the world, finding its victims first and foremost in the United States and the countries of Western Europe (England, West Germany and France). According to data published in the Pakistani press, almost 70 percent of the heroin consumed in recent years in the United States, and up to 80-90 percent of that in Western Europe, is of Pakistani origin. According to other information, out of the 50 billion dollars of net profits obtained from trafficking in heroin in the United States, the income of the Pakistani network of narcotics dealers is 20 billion dollars.

Such enormous profits are explained by the extreme cheapness of the narcotics at the place of production in Pakistan and their increase in price by tens of times in the countries of the West.

Western journalists have begun to use new names for the northern area of Pakistan--the "Golden Crescent" or the "Golden Cross"--by analogy with the "Golden Triangle" (the countries of Southeast Asia).

The energetic transformation of the country into a world center for the production of heroin has evoked concern. Diplomatic representatives of the United States in Pakistan have succeeded in turning attention to the dangerous scope of drug addiction and, referring to the sad experience of Malaysia, where a similar explosion occurred somewhat earlier, have proposed the implementation of effective measures.

The Pakistani authorities have listened to the advice. Making the activity of the governmental council for monitoring narcotics more active, a special amendment to the law on the distribution of narcotics that envisages life imprisonment for the possession of more than ten grams of heroin or a kilogram of opium was adopted and the organs that struggle against the contraband shipments of narcotics were reinforced. The government furthermore announced an expansion of the network of treatment centers and special stations for drug addicts.

Notwithstanding the severity of the legal measures of interdiction and the reinforcement of customs and border services, the government efforts were unable to effect any substantive change in the situation. The battle of the authorities with the "black business" only brings partial success. In 1985, for example, in the course of 25 major operations, customs agents seized 50 tons of hashish and 500 kilograms of heroin. In the course of the same year,



over 600 kilograms of heroin, several dozen tons of opium and hundreds of thousands of tons of hashish were confiscated in the NWFP. But, as the Pakistani press notes, this is but a drop in the ocean. In the opinion of the PAKISTAN TIMES, no more than 10 percent of the narcotic substances produced were discovered and withdrawn from circulation.

Having despaired of achieving results via a battle against the possession, transportation and sale of narcotics, the authorities tried to expand the "theater of combat operations," including the realm of producing the source material--the opium poppy--in it. It was decided to deprive the peasants of material incentives for cultivating poppy by granting them subsidy compensation. The United States allotted Pakistan two million dollars especially for this. England and several other international organizations also took part in the subsidy. But the compensation, judging overall, did not reach the peasants and "dissolved" in the corridors of the central and provincial departments. And then, to indulge the United States and cover their own sins, the government of the NWFP decided to make an example by punishing the "intractable" peasants that were "unwilling" to accept the preferential terms and cleanse their fields of the poppy crops. In the course of the skirmishes and clashes between NWFP police units and peasants in the regions of Gadun, Amazai and other, about ten people were killed and almost fifty wounded. The "Opium War," the Karachi journal HERALD feels, could have been avoided, and shots sounded only to demonstrate to the United States the "determination" of the authorities, and the fact that it cost human lives was of little concern.

#### The Curse of Corruption

A battle against social evil is doubtless essential, but the question is how to wage it and if it leads chiefly to someone's warming their hands on it. Corruption in Pakistan has long been considered the number-one problem. Bribery and embezzlement by the officials of various departments are written about by newspapers and journals of every persuasion. This does not, however, keep the cart from stopping where it is. The bacillus of corruption has even penetrated into those Pakistani organizations where the battle is supposed to be waged against the production and distribution of narcotics. This is namely one of the main immediate reasons for the failure to eradicate mass addiction and efforts to put a barrier on the path of the contraband narcotics.

Information has reached the world press on the fact that some of the most highly placed representatives of the Pakistani military and civilian administration have had a hand in the "export" of heroin. It has been confirmed that part of the upper bureaucracy of the NWFP is on the payroll of the heroin mafia. Among those entangled in the "black" business are the former military governor of the province, General Fazl-Haq, a reputed "strongman."

If one does not take corruption into account, the modest success of the customs, excise and border services in unmasking and halting the activity of the members of the "narco-mafia" can seem strange. Only the "small fry" are subject to arrest--the truck drivers transporting the illegal freight, the agents accompanying it etc. As for the big players, their detention is an

extremely rare occurrence. Even those of them that fall are caught red-handed, with over ten grams of heroin in their possession, avoid the strict punishment under the law--life imprisonment. As has become well known to Pakistani journalists, two out of three such "business travelers" turn out to be free within a year after their conviction, and the other is only threatened with spending another two years in prison. Events associated with the arrest of one of the "kings" of the underground business unfolded in the finest traditions of films about the Italian mafia. The popular Pakistani newspaper MUSLIM informs us that having fallen behind bars, he feigned illness, was transferred to the hospital and escaped from there.

#### Afghan "Refugees" and the Underground Economy

The capital of both the local and the international mafia is engaged in the trade of Pakistani narcotics, bringing enormous profits. The income of the Pakistani "mafiosi" is estimated by some organs of the local press at the round sum of ten billion dollars, which is only a little less than the total foreign indebtedness of the country. To this must be added the internal turnover from the sales of narcotic paraphernalia, which totals one percent of the GNP each year--in other words, it is more, for instance, than state appropriations for health care. Along with the concentration of capital in the hands of the "bosses," an enrichment of various types of middlemen, dealers and even hawkers of the "commodity" is occurring. There are, according to a number of estimates, more than 33,000 petty dealers for the sale of narcotics.

Dealing in narcotics has been turned into one of the largest sectors of underground business, and it has reached monstrous proportions in Pakistan today. Even officials estimate the turnover of the "black money" at a level of 15-20, or even 30, percent of national income.

The field of illegal operations of dealers, buyers and brokers in Afghanistan has begun to display particular activeness in recent years. Saving themselves from the national-democratic revolution, some of the Afghan rich men succeeded in taking considerable wealth along with them, which has served as their primary capital. Having discovered that Pakistan has favorable conditions for them, they have grown bolder by degrees and are more and more actively incorporating themselves into various spheres of trade and business. At first their dukans (shops and eating-houses) appeared in great quantities in Peshawar, in the NWFP, and next in Karachi, the "most Pushtu" of the Pakistani cities, where one and a half million people speaking one of the Afghan languages resides. At the same time, in other cities of Sind, as well as in Punjab and Baluchistan, the presence of resourceful "refugees" was noted. Trade and transport are their two favorite legal types of entrepreneurial activity. As for the illegal types, they consist of dealing in various contraband commodities (Japanese equipment, primarily domestic, and imported duty-free "consumer goods"), narcotics and weapons.

The Afghan factor in the underground economy, as well as in "normal" business, is becoming a more and more serious circumstance. The aggressiveness of the newly arrived operators is backed not only with money, but with weapons--to which they have easy access as a consequence of the "aid" rendered from abroad

to the Afghan counterrevolutionaries taking part in the undeclared war against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

The struggle for gain, including the skirmishes for such a "fat sum" as the profits from the production and sale of narcotics, was one of the detonators of the current explosion of bloody clashes between the representatives of various ethnic groups in Karachi, Hyderabad, Quetta and a number of other cities of Pakistan in November-December 1986. According to some reports, about 200 people were killed in the course of the clashes. These events set off yet another tragic aspect of the problem of narcotics--its link with the "death"--weapons--trade and the overall unsettled nature of the international situation in the region. And it is no accident that at the height of the excesses in Karachi, the police found a cache where more than 2.5 tons of heroin were hidden along with boxes of firearms intended, evidently, for the Afghan bands.

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**SOUTH AFRICA TRIES, FAILS TO FORM NEW BANTUSTAN, '2ND SOWETO'**

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 4, Apr 87 pp 29-30

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences V. Gorodnov under the rubric "Against Racism and Apartheid": "South Africa--A Still-Born Bantustan"]

[Text] The bantustan of Kwandebele and the settlement of Ekangala... Many write and speak of the former in South Africa, while extremely meager information on the latter finds its way into the press, although in justice it should be the other way around. After all, it was primarily due namely to Ekangala that the racists decided to throw together another bantustan or, according to official terminology, a "homeland"--Kwandebele--whose "independence" they intended to proclaim in December 1986.

As early as the beginning of the 1950s, when the regime began to conduct the policy of bantustanization, it was planned to create a special "homeland" for the representatives of the Ndebele nationality living in South Africa. Soon, however, its name disappeared from the list of future "independent" homelands. It was missing for about twenty years.

Since that time, first Transkei and then Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei have been declared "independent," and then matters were slowed down: the secret intent of the inventors of bantustanization became too clear, signifying not a concern for the self-determination of black South Africans at all, but rather an effort to alienate them to the benefit of the ruling minority. And here appeared Kwandebele from out of non-existence--the "lost one" was the tenth bantustan and was considered the least promising. At almost the same time, reports of Ekangala, which translated from Zulu means "desert," were faintly heard. This eloquent name had been given to an enormous settlement for Africans that the authorities intended to build in the dry steppes near the small city of Bronchorstspreit some 55 miles northeast of Johannesburg.

A short note published in the local STAR under the headline "Plans to lay down a second Soweto" stated that this development would be carried out in accordance with the government strategy of "deconcentration of industrial development": the creation of a new large industrial district of Ekandustria was envisaged, and the manpower for it would be concentrated in the settlement of Ekangala. It was proposed that by the end of the century its population would reach the then-official number of residents of Soweto--720,000 people.



It is true that to the extent of the realization of the plans, or rather their failure, the number got smaller and smaller: 520,000, 300,000 etc.

It seemed a good idea: develop the economy, create additional jobs and build a new "black" city, as the newspapers say. And in reality? What in fact actually happened?

Nothing was said of the plan for about two years, in the course of which it became clear that there would be no significant industrial complex in the aforementioned region. The solid firms refrained from the risky investment of capital, while the several small companies that went for it did not, as they say, affect the matter. Meanwhile, Ekangala grew rapidly. Its construction was handled by the East Rand Administrative Bureau--the government institution that controlled the "black" settlements in the industrial zone east of Johannesburg. Everything rose up in its place: the new and gigantic ghetto was intended not for those Africans that would be "favored" with the mythical Ekandustria, but for those who did not have housing of their own in the already existing settlements, but were needed by the old industrial center of the Witwatersrand region and Pretoria.

Modern-day Soweto was also created in its time as an enormous reservoir for the accommodation of manpower needed by Witwatersrand and especially Johannesburg. The racist authorities hoped then that their officials and police would be able to keep the residents of Soweto under strict surveillance so that the humble slaves could multiply the wealth of the white masters. It did not work out that way. The uprising of 1976 placed Soweto at the center of the struggle against racial and social oppression. Other settlements in the environs of Pretoria and Capetown, Port Elizabeth and Durban were also transformed into seats of furious resistance to the apartheid regime.

As a consequence of this, the decision was made to shift the "black" ghettos to the territory of the bantustans, which would, first of all, ensure dual monitoring of their inhabitants--direct, on the part of the puppet-collaborators, and hidden, but no less effective, on the part of the government--and second, would support the collapsing policy of bantustanization. In executing this design, several major settlements near Pretoria and Durban were transferred to the bantustans of Bophuthatswana and Kwazulu. The anticipated impact, however, did not result. It was then decided to build new ghettos, including them in the bantustans right from the start. Such were the true reasons for the appearance of Ekangala--a "second Soweto"--only this time within the bantustan of Kwandebele, which was rushed into "independence."

In 1981 Ekangala numbered some 620 homes already, the same kind of "matchboxes" as in Soweto, of which 470 were for Ndebeles and the rest for representatives of other ethnic groups. A certain calculation was hidden behind this breakdown--an effort to betray the future residents of the settlement. If all of Ekangala had been designated for the Ndebele, it would have been obvious that it had no other prospect than to join the bantustan. And that did not suit either the Ndebele or the more so all the rest.

It must be said that in 1983 there were up to 30,000 too few houses to accommodate the families of the Africans employed in the enterprises of East Rand in the "black" suburbs of the city. Later, the acuteness of the housing crisis got even worse. Furthermore, since September of 1984 stormy uprisings against racist procedures had begun everywhere. The authorities, by resettling some of the workers in Ekangala, were counting on weakening the heat of the battle in the striking ghettos: after all, the homeless, that is the most deprived and dissatisfied, were proposed for transfer.

The immigrants hoped to retain in principle the right to reside in these suburbs under Article 10 of the Law of 1945, which under the terms of apartheid was a substantial privilege: after all, the majority of the black South Africans do not have this right. At first it seemed that this had been promised, but a little later the officials "elaborated" that the aforementioned right did not extend to the children of the immigrants. Naturally, no one was pleased with the "elaboration." And more came later. Minister of Education and Development Aid (that is what the chief of the department that regulates the life of the non-white communities in South Africa is called today) Gerrit Viljoen announced in February of 1985 that the settlement would be included in the bantustan of Kwandebele. This reduced to naught the already illusory "guarantees" of the rights of the former city residents and made the residents of Ekangala, the number of whom had already reached 5,500, even more anxious.

The inhabitants of the new ghetto also turned out to be in difficult economic shape. To get a job in the small enterprises that had appeared nonetheless in Ekandustria was twice as hard as in Johannesburg, Springs or Benoni, but the road to those cities of the East Rand took about five hours and cost about three rands.

The dissatisfaction of the deceived and disenchanted Ekangala residents increased, and demonstrations against the inclusion of the settlement in Kwandebele began.

In order to protect their interests, the residents of the ghetto elected an action committee that demanded clear explanations from the government and announced that if the Ekangala residents were not satisfied, they would leave the settlement. The authorities were sent a memorandum of protest against the plans for including Ekangala in the bantustan that was signed by 70 percent of its residents. No answer followed. But the silence was not at all a sign of consent.

Naturally, it is no accident that the black-skinned collaborators with the regime, led by the "Chief Minister" of the bantustan, Simon Skosana, became more active. They subjected their own blood brothers to terror. The police forces turned out to be insufficient, and the so-called "Imbokoto" detachments ("millstones") came onto the stage--bands of the most backward adherents of tribalism, prone to pogroms, who were ordered to grind into dust any opposition to "independence." Armed with knives, sticks and whips, the Imbokoto beat to death those who allowed themselves to express doubts about the benefits of bantustanization too loudly. Skosana himself became the "president" of the criminal society, while in actuality its chief was the

"minister of internal affairs" and "strongman" of the bantustan, Pit Ntuli. He himself, not bashful about personally participating in cruel reprisals, carted off a hundred and fifty people.

Deceived by the officials in Pretoria and terrorized by the Imbokoto bands, the residents of Ekangala became more and more convinced that they had to take flight as soon as possible. In the beginning of 1986, more than a thousand families declared their intention of returning to the East Rand. Assuming that their former positions could be occupied, they even agreed to suffer any discomfort anywhere in the wastelands between the "black" settlements, as long as they were not in the "independent" bantustan.

At the same time, the apartheid regime accelerated the preparation of Kwandebele for "independence." People were transplanted there from other regions of the country by fair means or foul--frequently by force under police escort. Land was added to the small and poor bantustan at the expense of other homelands. A stadium was hurriedly built among the throng of miserable hovels for the ceremonies planned for 11 Dec 86 in the "capital" of Siabuswa, where private residences were singled out as "ministries" and a "parliament" building.

Neither promises nor bribes, however, were able to stop the resistance to the designs of Pretoria, which the majority of the 300,000-strong population was against, not to mention the residents of Ekangala and even representatives of the tribal aristocracy. The agitation of the people was so great that even the police under the command of white officers and the bands of Imbokoto turned out to be powerless. In Siabuswa, aside from the stadium, they had to erect a three-meter-high fence around the whole "government" quarter and place an around-the-clock guard on it.

All of the precautionary measures were futile. On the night of July 29, Siabuswa was rocked by a powerful explosion. A bomb planted in the car of the executioner and murderer Ntuli had literally blown him to bits just after he had left the confines of the protected complex in the city center. News of this flew across the bantustan at once, and celebrating began in all of its 25 settlements and villages. Responsibility for the retribution was claimed by the militarized wing of the African National Congress--the "Umkonto we sizwe" ("Lance of the Nation").

An extraordinary session--the most important and, perhaps, the sole one in the history of Kwandebele--of the "Legislative Assembly" of Kwandebele was held on August 20. In the presence of a multitude of people, filling the hall to overflowing and loudly expressing its inclinations, the "parliamentarians," including the "ministers" of the bantustan, adopted a unanimous resolution to reject the notorious "independence" and to disband the hated and bloody Imbokoto detachments. Even "Chief Minister" Skosana himself voted for it. He sat with his head in his hands and only once rose up to say: "In this house I am only a messenger on an errand. I did what was ordered and fulfilled those obligations with which I was entrusted. And now I am damned like a criminal. Even little children poke me with their fingers." The representatives of Pretoria had gloomy faces, and their leader, General Commissar Gerry van der Merwe, has already been relieved for the time being for the threads cited in



the Imbokoto movement and the "Cabinet of Ministers." The speaker of the "Legislative Assembly" summarized the results of the voting: "The question of independence has been torn up by the roots and cast into the depths of the ocean."

It is difficult to say how the future fate of the residents of Ekangala will turn out. It is possible that many will remain in the settlement, notwithstanding all of the burdens, and some of those that left will return. One thing is clear: that which was contrived by the regime--to create a "second Soweto," only obedient and controllable, on the territory of the puppet bantustan--did not turn out. The battle is far from over, however. The inhabitants of Ekangala and Kwandebele, along with all their oppressed countrymen, are continuing to fight for a unified democratic South Africa free of apartheid.

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10TH CONFERENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ASIAN HISTORIANS' ASSOCIATION

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 4, Apr 87 p 47

[Article by Doctor of Economic Sciences Vl. Li under the rubric "Scientific Life": "A Forum for Oriental Studies Historians"]

[Text] One of the articles of the charter of the International Asian Historians' Association (IAHA) states that the noble mission of this organization consists first and foremost of assisting to the utmost the most rapid renaissance of national historical sciences in the liberated countries via a painstaking search for new data, the mutual exchange of scientific information, the holding of open symposia and the active popularization of historical sciences as a "tool for furthering international peace, mutual understanding and friendship."

Over the last quarter century of its existence, the IAHA has done much for the convergence and collaboration of the national historical schools of the developing countries of Asia. At its representative congresses, which are convened every two or three years, the key questions of the many centuries of history of the Eastern peoples are discussed in detail, which history over the course of decades has been intentionally distorted by the bourgeois "Eurocentric" Oriental studies of the West.

The latest, 10th Conference of the IAHA was held in Singapore. More than 200 Oriental studies historians from 30 countries of the world took part in it, including representatives of India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Bangladesh and Malaysia, as well as Australia, Japan, the United States, England, Canada and others. The USSR and China were among the socialist states participating in the work of the conference. Unfortunately, the Singaporean authorities refused entry visas to the scholars of Vietnam, which evoked the deep disappointment of many conference participants. As the well-known Indian researcher and professor of Delhi University, D. Simon, declared in this regard, in the future the scholarly congresses of the IAHA should be held where the granting of visas is guaranteed for all foreign scholars--either permanent or associate members of the organization.

Notwithstanding this vexing incident, the immediate initiators of the IAHA conference--a group of associates at Singapore University--did everything

possible for the success of the forum. On the eve of the conference and in the course of it, they were fruitfully joined by scholars of such highly regarded scholarly institutions as the International Congress on Asian and North African Research, the Indian Historical Research Council, the Italian Institute on Asian Problems, the National University of Malaysia, the Philippine University and other scholarly centers represented in the guiding organs of the IAHA, which is headquartered in Manila.

What can be said about the trends that were manifested in the work of the conference? They were reflected first and foremost in a turn in the study of the developing countries to the most burning issues of modern history, especially those problems that are immediately associated with the history of national-liberation revolutions. One important thought can be steadfastly traced in detailed papers based on archival documentation and in the reports of the scholars of the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and a number of other countries of the Orient: the winning of national independence is not the end at all, but rather the starting line on a long and multistage path for the full decolonization of the previously oppressed Asian society.

The most authoritative historical schools of the Asian countries, as became well known at the conference, devote attention not only to historical research, but also to forecasting development prospects for the region. These types of forecasts can include the work of Professor D. Klaymkola of Philippine University "Problems of Regional Integration within the Framework of ASEAN," Professor L. Laker of the Philippine Institute of Technology "The Muslim Problem on Mindanao and its Reflection in the Policies of the ASEAN Countries," Professor D. Simon of Delhi University "Religious and Communal Problems of Contemporary India," Professor Tan Chiben of Malaysia University "Publications of Ethnic Chinese in the ASEAN Countries" and others.

During the work of the conference, its organizational committee, in conjunction with Singapore University, the Institute of Southeast Asia and other scholarly centers, organized an extremely impressive exhibition of the latest publications and periodicals, as well as a visit of the forum participants to these scholarly centers and meetings and discussions with leading specialists.

Among the most interesting works displayed at the exhibition were the basic research on the latest and most recent history and contemporary socio-political problems of the Philippines, Indonesia, India, Thailand, Singapore and other countries of the region. The discussion sessions and one of the exhibitions included presentations on the history of the "February Revolution" of 1986 in the Philippines, the history of the insurgent movement in Southeast Asia, the history of Vietnamese--Kampuchean relations etc. The Oriental Studies Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences presented a paper on the role of the intellectual factor in the post-colonial development of the countries of the Orient that provoked animated discussion, first and foremost in connection with a criticism of the concepts of "Eurocentrism" and "Asiacentrism."

It should be noted that Soviet Oriental studies scholars constantly devote considerable attention to historical research on the countries of the Orient and the training of young personnel. The work of the All-Union Conference of Department Chairs of the Social Sciences of higher educational institutions in our country testifies to this in particular.

A number of progressively inclined scholars participating in the Singapore forum justly noted that historical truth, however harsh it may be, is of a deeply objective nature and should not be corrected depending on current notions. This is especially important in our century of global scientific and technical contacts and interactions and a persistent quest for the principles of a non-violent world, mutual understanding, compromise and co-existence.

The extremely substantive and useful experience of the Singapore forum, without any doubt, will be of serious assistance to the standing executive committee of the association in the further development of scholarly contacts in the region and the organization of the next, 11th IAHA Conference planned for Sri Lanka.

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BOOK ON ASIAN SOCIALIST EXPERIENCE REVIEWED

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 4, Apr 87 pp 62-63

[Review "The Construction of Socialism in Asian Countries" by Doctor of Economic Sciences Yu. Aleksandrov of book "Opyt stroitelstva sotsialisticheskoy ekonomiki v stranakh Azii" [Experience in the Construction of a Socialist Economy in the Countries of Asia]. Editor-in-Chief G.V. Gryaznov. Moscow, Oriental Literature Section of Nauka Publishing House, 1986, 292 pp]

[Text] The book contains a comparative analysis and summary of the development practice of socialist economies in Mongolia, Korea, Laos and Vietnam, that is, in the countries that are distinguished by a unity of basic approaches to the fundamental principles of the construction of socialism that have been developed by the world socialist community.

The principal goal of the research is, "based on the general theoretical tenets of Marxism-Leninism, to reveal the basic principles and methods for the realization of the chief general economic laws of socialist construction under the specific conditions of previously backward countries" (p 5). The authors concentrate attention on the specific key problems of the transitional stage to socialism: on its typical qualities and specific features in individual countries; ways of socialist reconstruction for agriculture and industrialization and the formation and development of planned management of the economy; the significance of economic collaboration with the USSR and the other socialist countries.

The principal intent of the book is realized in this manner--to trace the lines of mutual connection among the tasks of the transitional period and to reach the level of the problems that arise in the course of resolving them. The research is called upon in the same manner to facilitate the development of general theoretical concepts on the general laws of the transitional period in initially backward countries and the specific nature of this process in each of the instances under consideration. Thus Vietnam, for example, is distinguished by an overpopulation typical of most of the Southeast Asian countries; Korea--somewhat more developed against the background of the other backward countries--is distinguished by industry with relatively limited land and labor resources; Mongolia and Laos are distinguished by the particular initial lack of development of the structure of productive forces. All of

them also differ to a certain extent among each other in the correlation of socio-economic institutions and internal political conditions.

The specific materials and positions of the book make it possible to see a number of common general laws of the objective socio-economic process beyond specific local features that advance ever more distinctly to the forefront to the extent of the construction of the foundations of the socialist economy and require the constant development of strategy for the transitional period. The basic substance of these general laws is dictated by the objective logic of the necessity of advancing from the formal collectivization of the economy to a real one that allows the full implementation of the principles of socialism.

One of the basic problems in the construction of socialism in countries with a backward multi-institutional economy and a preponderance of peasant population is collectivization in agriculture. The Asian socialist countries resolve this problem under varying conditions, which ultimately has left a deep imprint on their agrarian policies. A policy of developing various forms of contracts that are deemed an effective means of including abundant agrarian labor resources in productive labor has been more and more distinctly defined in Vietnam in recent years. In Korea, on the other hand, emphasis has been placed on the mechanization of agriculture, insofar as accelerated industrialization creates a shortage of manpower in the agrarian sector. In Mongolia, the problem of transition from extensive agriculture to intensive has moved to the forefront, while in Laos the main thing today is a search for effective means for activating the productive potential of labor resources in the backward institutions of the agrarian economy.

But a commonality of the problems of socialist construction in agriculture can be discerned behind these specific features: the necessity of seeking ways for the utmost activation of the "human factor" through the harmonious combination of collective and individual interests of the workers based on the development of a system of economic incentives for economic activity.

In constructing the material and technical base of a socialist economy, the Asian countries have encountered great difficulties conditioned by general economic backwardness. This has provoked the necessity (with the well-known exception of Korea) of a prolonged stage of creating the base preconditions for the expansion of industrialization, which, in turn, is considered a prospective task for the comparatively distant period (pp 142-146). At this stage, aside from the earlier one, important problems in increasing accumulation through internal and external sources and the choice of base types of production for the first stages of industrialization are resolved. Substantial specific national features are revealed herein in relation to the products of light and heavy industry, traditional and new sectors and rates of growth. It also becomes common that to the extent that the structure of the economy becomes more complicated, the significance of raising the efficiency of economic operation increases as well--first and foremost through making the combination of centralized planning methods and ever greater complete economic accountability more harmonious. The priority of overall general laws for creating the material and technical base of socialism over specific national features is evident.

The enumerated problems are seemingly concentrated in the task of further developing the system of planned management of the building of a socialist economy. The paramount significance of deepening and strengthening its democratic substance in accomplishing the management of the economy with the general principle of democratic centralism is being recognized more and more clearly. In the process of improving the planning mechanism, more attention is being devoted to the cost lever of economic regulation and the necessity of specifically attracting workers into management. The socialist countries of Asia (especially Vietnam and Laos) must energetically seek methods of including non-socialist institutions in the process of constructing a socialist economy.

The consistent resolution of the fundamental tasks of the transitional period is ensured through the development of comprehensive collaboration of the socialist countries of Asia and the USSR and the other countries of the community (see Ch. 5). This assists the rapid formation of the material and technical base of socialism and the choice of the optimal parameters for the national-economic structure. The book stresses the general trend of the development of collaboration--a movement in the direction of economic integration with the increasing significance of technical and economic ties, along with the extension of the principles of planning to this sphere.

Overall, the materials and conclusions of the book under review reveal important general laws of the strategy of building a socialist economy in the countries being considered. The reader can trace, in the course of socio-economic transformations and economic operation, how the search for ways of employing general principles of the construction of a socialist economy is accomplished under local conditions is accomplished, how the topical tasks of maintaining optimal rates of movement through the stages of the transitional period toward socialism are resolved, the creation of its material and technical base, the realization of its principles and the activation of the creative potential of the workers. Those problems that, although they are of varying qualities, are currently topical for all of the socialist countries ultimately advance to the forefront therein.

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BOOK ON CONFLICTS IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN REVIEWED

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 4, Apr 87 pp 63-64

[Review "Inflammable Problems of the Mediterranean" by T. Sanginov of book "Osobennosti politiki imperializma v Vostochnom Sredizemnomorye" [Specific Features of the Policies of Imperialism in the Eastern Mediterranean] by V.A. Shmarov. Moscow, Oriental Literature Section of Nauka Publishing House, 1986, 256 pp]

[Text] The eastern Mediterranean is an area of heightened international tensions. Regional conflicts have for decades smoldered and then burst into flames here: the Arab-Israeli, the Lebanese, the Cypriot and the whole set of Greek-Turkish contradictions. This situation has been aggravated recently by the openly aggressive actions of American imperialism against Lebanon and the campaign of threats against Syria carried out within the framework of the doctrine of "neoglobalism."

The book under review is devoted to an analysis of international relations in the region and the discovery of the negative and destabilizing effects of the policies of imperialism on them.

The issue of the use of the conflicts by imperialist circles to regulate regional relations seems to merit serious attention from theoretical scholarly and practical points of view. A topic of particular attention of the author is the principal areas and characteristic features of the policies of the United States and NATO in the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus "triangle." The transformation of Cyprus into a distinctive arena for clashes between the two junior partners of the United States in NATO is pushing the country into the abyss of serious crisis. For American diplomacy, this serves as an approved method of keeping Greece and Turkey in the orbit of "Atlantic" influence and the unilateral "management" of conflicts. Although the author's conception of crisis "management" is considered based on the example of the interaction of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, it is wholly applicable, in particular, to the state of affairs in the Near East, including the tragically developing Lebanese events. It is noteworthy that Shmarov researches not only the forces operating in the seats of tension, but also the dialectical development of conflicts themselves.



The author traces the process of the division of the eastern Mediterranean into spheres of influence or "patronage" zones as practiced by the imperialist powers--England, West Germany and France--who are trying to maintain their positions in Cyprus, Turkey and Greece via the reinforcement of priority ties (pp 40-41).

Having analyzed the principal features of the policies of the United States and NATO that are most distinctly manifested in the course of conflict situations, Shmarov demonstrates that these situations form a multilayered fabric of interwoven mutual dependencies that bind individual links together into a unified whole--a whole set of seats of tension. This direction of research seems extraordinarily important from the point of view of both the theory and practice of contemporary international relations.

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PRAVDA CORRESPONDENT ON VIEWS OF GEORGE KENNAN

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 May 87 p 7

[Article by G. Vasilyev, PRAVDA correspondent: "Insight: George Kennan on Soviet-American Relations"]

[Text] New York--The talent for examining one's views, rejecting those which do not conform to reality and to develop new ones which are in keeping with the requirements of the times is an important quality of a true scientist, politician or public figure. When you think of such people in the U.S.A., the name of George Kennan, an eminent diplomat and historian immediately springs to mind.

Here he is quite properly considered to be an elder American "sovietologist" and a representative of that faction that advocates a search for agreement between the two sides, restraint in the arms race and the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe. I recently met with him once again. This took place during a reception held in the Slavic Branch of the New York Public Library. Kennan delivered a brilliant speech on the international importance of Russian culture and he vividly discussed our great Russian literature, which has drawn people together and which has generously endowed them with an intelligent and eternal gift. I wished very much to ask the former United States ambassador to the Soviet Union to share his thoughts concerning the present world situation and the prospects for Soviet-American relations. But I was unable to arrange an interview. "I have made a decision not to give any more interviews" stated the 80 year old historian. And he added, by way of softening the rejection: "My thoughts concerning today's situation can be found in the spring issue of the journal FOREIGN AFFAIRS."

And I now have in my hands this particular issue of the respected American political journal. This is somewhat of an unusual issue. It contains an entire selection of materials in which the article by George Kennan is dedicated to a type of "jubilee." "Containment 40 Years Later" reads the headline which opens up the selection.

Forty years ago, in July 1947, an article entitled "Sources of Soviet Behavior" was published in an issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS. The author of the article, who signed it using the pseudonym "X," argued that in the foreseeable future the U.S.A. "must view the USSR as a rival and not as a

partner in the political arena." In the form of a long-term policy, he proposed the carrying out, with regard to the Soviet Union, of a policy of "firm containment, which would counter the inflexible counterforce in all areas where the Russians are displaying signs of infringing upon the interests of a peaceful and free world." The hope was expressed in the article that pressure on the Soviet Union from without would bring about "either the downfall or a gradual softening of Soviet rule."

The anonymity of the author continued only for a brief period of time. Before long it became known that the "Mister X" was none other than George Kennan, who had returned home following work in the United States Embassy in Moscow. The concept of "containing communism" became the theoretical basis for United States policy during the post-war years with regard to its recent ally.

This policy has cost mankind dearly. It brought about the "cold war," it divided the world into opposing military-political blocs and it unleashed an arms race. But neither the downfall nor a softening of Soviet rule occurred. To the contrary, the Soviet Union has become a powerful industrial power and it has achieved military-strategic parity with the United States. Today, 40 years later, this is all very clear.

But there is obviously still one other circumstance. The sword of Damocles in the form of nuclear weapons hangs over mankind. They have accumulated to such a degree that war can no longer be viewed as a means for resolving political conflicts. Even a lesser known political figure is aware of this fact. And of course it is well understood by George Kennan.

In an article entitled "Containment Then and Now" (it is published in the journal immediately following a reprinting of the old 1947 article), George Kennan explains his earlier views and expounds upon his thoughts today. The term "containment of communism" has not been understood correctly. It has been interpreted as a call to military confrontation with the Soviet Union, whereas the author had in mind political and ideological opposition.

The historian goes on to state that today the military factor has assumed primary importance in Soviet-American relations. "And it is my opinion" he continued, "that it is not because the Soviet Union threatens the United States or its allies with its armed forces. It is completely clear to me that the Soviet leaders do not want war with us and are not planning to begin one." "The arms race in which both they and ourselves are participating" writes Kennan, "represents a most serious threat not because of aggressive intentions by either one of the sides, but rather because of the difficult situations, suspicions and anxieties engendered by such rivalry and also serious dangers and unforeseen complications -- as a result of mistakes, computer breakdowns, incorrectly interpreted signals or as a result of third party provocations.

"It is not the Soviet Union that must first of all be contained today but rather it is the arms race" concluded George Kennan. He addressed an appeal to have the efforts of people directed towards restraining those phenomena which threaten all mankind, such as poisoning of the atmosphere, the exhaustion of irreplaceable energy resources, instability in the "third world" and terrorism. Kennan advises Americans first of all to learn how to restrain

themselves, their destructive attitude towards nature, the tendency to live above their means and to overcome their inability to cope with a catastrophic budget deficit. And this scientist offered one other piece of advice for those who are in control in Washington -- in developing solutions for problems with the Soviet Union, employ a more thorough and experienced view of this country than that which has become rooted in American public rhetoric."

From containment of communism to containment of the arms race -- this path laid out by George Kennan in his world outlook reflects the evolutionary views of those political and public figures in the West who, in overcoming the narrow-class trend in reflection, are striving to understand the more important tasks of the century.

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APR. REPORTS WICK NEWS CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW.

Moscow /APR DAILY REVIEW in English 9 Jun 67 pp 1-2

[APR item under the rubric 'News and Views': 'APR Reports: A Press Conference by USIA Director Charles Wick']

[Text] Charles Wick, director of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), described the results of his week's visit to the Soviet Union as good.

During a news conference in the American Embassy he told journalists that his aim in coming to the Soviet Union was to open an American exhibition in Moscow and to reach understanding on sensitive issues between the two countries.

Fifteen meetings and conversations he had with top political leaders in Moscow must have altered some of his views.

Sharing his views about Soviet processes, he said that glasnost was a serious thing.

A few weeks ago he was saying something different, if not entirely opposite. We have here an example of the worth of seeing developments with one's own eyes.

Charles Wick said he was pleased with most of his meetings in the Soviet Union. He thinks that in this nuclear age which calls for constructive Soviet-American cooperation in dealing with world problems the two countries must get rid of mutual hostility and reproaches.

It is hard to disagree with this. Only, the Soviet people have never felt hostile to the Americans. Offence, indignation and even anger, whenever these have been provoked, have had their grounds and were not directed at the American people but at the policies and actions of the country's leaders when they defied others' interests.

The exhibition did not feature much at the press conference. Charles Wick concentrated on a different subject. He raised the question of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe. It is no secret whose funds finance these organisations and what is the purport of their broadcasts. One need only look into the Congress minutes. But nothing daunted, the USIA director was prepared to

equate these stations in a sense with Radio Moscow. Lack of balance marked his observations on Soviet and American TV programmes and films respectively about the U.S. and the USSR, and also on limited access to the State Department and other American government offices for journalists from the socialist countries accredited in the United States. He claimed that this was due to considerations of security. There was, however, no support for his words, since discrimination of journalists from the socialist countries does not cease to be discrimination by pleading security.

Describing his meetings with Soviet media representatives, Wick noted that he had a sharp discussion in Novosti Press Agency. He did not like what was said by the Soviet side on the role of the American administration in suppressing national liberation movements.

On the whole, Wick described the results of his visit as quite positive. It helped to invigorate exchanges between the sides. If this statement implies USIA's readiness to improve the climate between the U.S. and the USSR, it can only be welcomed.

(APN, June 3. In full.)

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REVIEW OF BOOK ON MYTH OF SOVIET 'THREAT'

Moscow OBSHCHESTVENNYE NAUKI V SSSR: SERIYA 5--ISTORIYA (REFERATIVNYY ZHURNAL) in Russian No 1, 1987 pp 81-83

[Review by N.N. Mesyatsev of book "Samaya bolshaya lozh XX veka: mif o 'Sovetskoy ugroze'" [The Biggest Lie of the 20th Century: The Myth of the 'Soviet Threat'] by A. Ye. Yefremov, Politizdat, Moscow, 1986, number of copies not given, 143 pages]

[Text] The book, which consists of an introduction and six chapters, familiarizes the reader with "how the myth of the 'Soviet threat' has been used at various stages of development of the international situation after World War II and what particular tasks international imperialism has solved or tried to solve using it" (p 4).

After the end of World War II U.S. imperialist circles conceived the idea of utilizing to the fullest extent their traditional methods of using force to carry out large-scale expansion using nuclear weapons in order to achieve world domination. Fabrications of the "Soviet threat"--a myth generated and used by world imperialist reaction from the moment the Soviet Socialist State came into being--were the means to disguise these goals.

This myth was utilized to the fullest extent when the basic political and military-strategic doctrines of the United States, like the "Truman Doctrine," for example, were developed in the postwar years (p 13). Fabrications of the "Soviet threat" were adopted by the aggressive NATO bloc. The imperialist propaganda machine widely circulated the assertion that supposedly there was no point in concluding any agreements on arms limitation or reduction with the Soviet Union since it could not be trusted. Moreover, it imposed the thesis on public opinion that in order to guarantee the security of the countries of the West, force should be exclusively relied upon rather than arms limitation agreements. "After exchanging the one for the other in the 'Cold War' years... the propaganda campaign 'on the Soviet threat' encouraged a marked buildup of arms in the United States and in other NATO countries" (p 44).

The book traces how in the 1970's the "Cold War" was replaced by detente due to the efforts of the Soviet State, the fraternal countries of socialism, and all democratic forces. The alleviation of the international situation "fostered the appearance of some skepticism regarding the myth of the 'Soviet

threat" (p 60). However, imperialist circles disseminated this myth in the second half of the 1970's, the author shows, in essentially the same forms as in the "Cold War" period. Trying to boost the arms race, they continued to repeat over and over that the USSR had leaped forward in the buildup of strategic forces in the preceding decade while the United States had supposedly done nothing to increase its nuclear arsenal. In 1978 NATO approved a long-term program of arms calculated for 15 years (p 72). In 1979 NATO adopted the "dual" decision to deploy American medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe (p 73). In violation of the spirit of the SALT-2 Treaty U.S. President Carter signed Directive No 59 on the "new U.S. nuclear strategy," which counted on delivering a 'preemptive' strike against objectives in the socialist countries and on waging "limited" nuclear war (p 76). Intimidating the public with the growth in the "Soviet danger," the administration of U.S. President Reagan went further and adopted a course to secure world domination by the United States, achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union, and destroy socialism as a sociopolitical system (p 104).

Spreading the myth of the "Soviet threat" and fabrications of the USSR's "aggressive intentions," the imperialists manipulate figures on the "menacing number" of Soviet divisions, bombers, tanks, and missiles and speculate on comparing the military budgets of the United States, the Western European countries, and the USSR. To this accompaniment allocations for the arms race continue to increase astronomically in the United States and in the NATO countries. Thus, the U.S. budget for the 1986 financial year was ratified at more than 300 billion dollars--substantially more than in the previous year (p 133).

The book notes the interrelationship between the rapid growth in military allocations and outbreaks of intensity in the campaign on the "Soviet military threat." The "Star Wars" program, which the Reagan administration is also trying to drag its allies into, is convincing proof of this.

The author emphasizes that Washington's provocative actions and its "Star Wars" policy show the entire world again and again that the U.S. administration, with no concern for the consequences, continues to play with fire and create an ever more serious danger to the fate of mankind. "The overwhelming majority of people understand this" (p 138). The antiwar, antinuclear movement is intensifying, including in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, for whom, the author writes, the myth of the "Soviet threat" is also calculated (p 79).

At the Soviet-American summit conference (1986) the USSR affirmed its support of an all-encompassing set of measures it had proposed to close off all paths of the arms race. These measures again confirm that the myth "of the Soviet threat" is nothing but the biggest lie of the 20th century.

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# POTENTIAL FOR GREEK-TURKISH MILITARY CONFLICT VIEWED

Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 7 Apr 87 p 3

[Article by Ye. Kalyadina, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA special correspondent, Athens: "Transoceanic Instigators"]

[Text] Fortunately, the worst has not happened. The military conflict which could flare up between Greece and Turkey has managed to be avoided. Nonetheless, it is too early to declare the Greek-Turkish crisis over.

The following is an outline of events. In late March the Turkish ship "Sismik," going beyond Turkish territorial waters into the Aegean Sea, set its course for three Greek islands. According to information from Athens, it intended to explore for oil on the shelf. The problem of the shelf, of course, is still a subject of sharp disagreement in relations between the two countries. Greece believes it has the right to do what it wants with the entire shelf of the Aegean islands which belong to it. But Turkey does not agree. Athens warned that if the Turkish ship "Sismik" violated Greek maritime borders, it would be destroyed. According to the responding statement of the Turkish side, this meant the start of military actions. Greece brought its armed forces into a state of armed preparedness. But the matter did not reach the extreme--"Sismik" returned to the Turkish shores.

So, what is behind the events in the Aegean Sea? Or better, the question should be who is behind them? The Prime Minister of Greece A. Papandreou gave the answer when he announced that the United States and its NATO allies bore full responsibility for the conflict. It was not without reason that the Athens newspaper ETNOS gave the following headline on 29 March 1987: "The United States lit the fuse in the Aegean Sea." It was said directly and precisely. Washington consciously fans the Greek-Turkish disagreement, trying to more deeply involve both countries in carrying out its militaristic schemes.

Not long before the crisis the United States signed an agreement with Turkey on economic and military cooperation; under it the Americans got the right to keep their bases on Turkish territory as compensation for regular dollar infusions. And as for Greece, according to the treaty in operation, U.S. bases must be withdrawn from the country next year. Understandably, this does not suit Washington, but the Greek government continues to obstinately

declare its intention to act as the treaty instructs. So at that time the United States simply decided to take up the "whip." If you kick the bases out, they said in an effort to intimidate Greece, there is nothing left for us to do but alter the proportion of military aid in favor of Turkey. Then a verbal bombardment followed which developed into a strike by force. Although it is understandable that it is not simple to find open proof of the United States' direct participation in the conflict in the Aegean Sea. But it was no accident that, in his statement on the events, A. Papandreou pointed to the fact that the Turkish Prime Minister T. Ozal was in the United States the entire time and the Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger and his aids were conducting negotiations in Turkey.

So, the events in the Aegean Sea began to develop according to the scenario worked out by the United States. However, there was a misfire. People in Washington, most likely, did not at all expect that the Greek government would be firm in this situation.

It remains to add that in discussing the lessons of the Aegean conflict, many people in Athens have drawn an unambiguous conclusion: the membership of Greece in NATO and the presence of American military bases and nuclear weapons on its territory are certainly the centers where, while they exist, the flame of conflicts will continually flare up, undermining the security not only of Greece, but of the entire Balkan region.

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BRAZIL'S DOMESTIC SITUATION, INTERNATIONAL POSITION VIEWED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 4, Apr 87 pp 5-13

[Article by V. P. Lukin, S. A. Mikoyan: "Brazil in the Modern World"]

[Excerpts] We live in a rapidly-changing world...Probably many generations of people who have lived on this planet before us could utter this phrase with greater or lesser justification. However, for our generation it acquires a special significance.

After all, today on the eve of the third millenium the pace of world changes has accelerated greatly, by several factors. This refers above all to scientific-technical changes. In the words of K. Marx, today the production process is less and less a process that is "subordinate to the direct mastery of the worker and more the technical application of science." This tendency in scientific-technical progress has had an enormous, truly revolutionary effect on all aspects of public life, has displaced traditional criteria for evaluating the power and might of states and has become one of the basic elements permeating the entire system of international relations.

Scientific-technical progress has been transformed into the most important (although of course not the only) factor which has sharply increased the level of interdependence in our world. During the last decade international relations have acquired, for the first time in the history of mankind, a truly international nature. Of course, since the beginning of the epoch of imperialism the world has been divided among the largest capitalist centers of empire and in this sense units had been created that were not related to geographical location. However, these changes remained to a large degree superficial--as before there were few subjects for world policy. Only the geographical space that foreign relations encompassed had increased, and the purpose of these relations was the struggle for colonies and dependent zones in the world. The majority of humankind continued to be outside active participation in the international sphere.

Recently this local world has been replaced by a world that is genuinely common to all of us. Dozens of new states came into the historical arena and step by step they began to look for the best ways to participate independently in international political processes. These difficult searches, not always

leading to rapid and automatic success have nevertheless brought palpable results today.

One of the important and relatively new phenomena in this plan is the notable activization of the "Brazilian factor." Evidently the experience gathered by Brazilian diplomats in the Western hemisphere and to an extent in African and Near Eastern regions will help it to have a weightier word on questions that touch other countries and continents as well as on man's global problems.

It is sufficient to remember the domestic and foreign policy course of Brazil during the period of the military dictatorship. Development at any price with complete disregard for the interests of the masses, and open support by reactionary circles for the United States was accompanied by the development of a fairly large-scale and sometimes even expansionist doctrine of a right-wing nationalist direction and by attempts to implement it in practical foreign policy activities. Not always by far did Itamarati, that "brain center" of Brazilian diplomacy, have the opportunity to make realistic corrections in the ideological bases of foreign policy activities of the right-wing dictatorship. Moreover, this political course went far beyond the framework of the continent.

With the beginning of the democratization process this type of "central power" course became obsolete through a natural process. At the present time Brazil is more actively seeking its own unique place in the world family of peoples as a peace-loving and non-aligned state. We are speaking about its rejection of "activism" on a foreign policy plane. On the contrary, in contrast to previous sham activism, genuine activism is increasing in Brazil, although perhaps this process is not proceeding as swiftly as some Brazilians would like.

Still, the "Brazilian factor" is now more and more noticeable in the entire world, including in places where it was heretofore absent. Here there has been a considerable change in the direction and the vector of operations of Brazil's "power center." Quite recently some people included Brazil, and not without reason, on the list of "subimperialistic states," i.e. in essence intermediaries of the United States as concerns its dark undertakings in "Third World" countries. Today Brazil is a worthy and respected participant in the great society of non-aligned nations who actively work to solve the problems of the developing world. There was a time when Brazil's military, called upon by Washington to be column across the path of such changes, played a reactionary role in a number of Latin American countries striving for radical social change. Let us look at least at Central America. Here the tone is set by Brazilian diplomats who strive for close cooperation with colleagues from the "support group" in order to subdue nuclei of conflicts and aggressive actions and to create the conditions for peaceful and non-aligned development of all without excluding the countries of this subregion.

The more and more constructive role played by Brazil's "power center" in the world arena could be even more dynamic if Brazilians could become stronger internally in the economic and social spheres. Meanwhile, enormous work still remains in this area—it is probably difficult to find another country in the

developing world where the contrasts between poverty and affluence, between scientific-technical progress and social backwardness are so striking.

However, another important circumstance that complicates the situation even further is the creation of a hard and unyielding "mechanism for inhibiting" Brazilian economic development by the "great Northern friend," as Washington officials introduce themselves in magnificent terms to Brazilians. Brazil had only to begin the development of production of computer technology when from the United States was heard the harsh bellow: "We won't tolerate it." The mask of the friend was unwittingly torn off.

We should, however, focus attention on the fact that today, at the end of the second millenium, competition between Brazilian and American economies is proceeding within the sphere of modern equipment and technology. This speaks of the fact that Brazil has travelled a long road in the last 10 years despite all the complications and costs--sometimes great and often without foundation. It is firmly becoming a dynamic, weighty factor in the modern varied and interdependent world.

One of the most important characteristics of this world is the fact that democratic processes are more and more energetically building themselves a road through all barriers and impediments. We truly welcome the decisive change in Brazil toward the path of democracy, toward that respect of civil rights that is possible in middle class society. We feel that this change alone was the foundation for the "light at the end of the tunnel"--for several very considerable indexes indicating that the country will be able to overcome the critical situation that clearly developed there during the mid-1980's.

Brazil is one of the largest countries in the world in size and population. Over 130 million people live on 8.5 million square kilometers of land. According to its GDP [Gross Domestic Product] Brazil is among the 10 most developed countries; according to social indicators--below 50th. "The economic miracle," which 10-15 years ago was still fed illusions about the possibility of leaving the framework of backwardness with the help of its older partners who proclaimed the world of capitalism, came to an end as abruptly as it had begun. Brazilians were left with the largest foreign debt in the world, with a high rate of inflation, with an enormous domestic debt, with a sharp drop in the standard of living of the masses and with a growth in unemployment. The economic crisis gave rise to a volatile social situation. This in turn threatened the process of liberation that had begun in the first half of the 1980's. It turned out that the military regime, which together with rapid economic growth had also created the prerequisites for an acute economic crisis, had brought the country to an impasse that could be dealt with only through social changes on a scale that would have the military leave its barracks once again. This would have truly resulted in a vicious circle because it could only have closed off all promising solutions to the impasse.

Fortunately, the mole of history, if we use Marx's terminology, did his work not without purpose. The changes that began within domestic policy were able to acquire an irreversible nature. Under extensive social pressure that which was planned as "decompression" crossed the limits of liberalism and showed the



path toward democratization. The struggle of the people to expand and increase democratic changes snowballed, if we can use this image in a tropical country.

Of course it would be incorrect to exaggerate successes along this road or to idealize achievements. For how can we talk about equality with the horrible poverty of many millions of people, about freedom under conditions of severe capitalist exploitation, or about democracy under conditions of arbitrary rule locally, mass illiteracy and undeveloped nature of the class political consciousness of millions of people? Still we must consider the dynamics. It is important to compare that which is to that which was quite recently. Thus, complexity, contradiction and diversity are the characteristic features of Brazil's development today.

By utilizing the great resources of the country, by stimulating a dynamic forward movement, and by counteracting the negative effects of imperialist exploitation and of extortion of capital for U.S. banks, Western Europe and Japan, it appears that Brazilian society has been able to step back from the edge of the abyss and to overstep the boundary of catastrophe. Suffice it to say that during the past year its GDP has increased by almost 9 percent. Price freezes for basic items contrary to the usual prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund, which proposes to lay the entire burden of a solution on the debt slavery on the masses!, has enabled Brazil to maintain its domestic market on a level capable of supporting growing production.

The growth of export, economy in curtailing imports (including, apart from the partial substitution for oil, the ban on importing mini-computers) and other elements of the "Kruzado plan" have increased the hope that even distant prospects for regulating the foreign debt are realistic.

In connection with this last circumstance it is essential to note the importance of Brazil's position within the framework of North-South relations. Large imperialist plunderers which have brought it, as well as many other countries of the "third world," to the brink of destruction, are themselves afraid of such failure. An association of debtor nations, in particular in the manner proposed by Fidel Castro, would be the most radical solution for the latter. But even partial agreements regarding actions to be taken on the basis of, let us say, resolutions passed in Peru would play the role of boomerang, the blow of which would shake the entire credit-financial system of the "world's powers." For this reason these powers have to be more circumspect in the course of consciously robbing their junior partners. This is why the more developed debtor nations with resources at their disposal are in a position to play on the completely realistic fears of the capitalist North regarding the extreme consequences of their own policies. Of course bargaining alone is less effective than collective action. This path is convenient for some but it cannot alter the general order of things and leaves those with poorer resources in an even worse position. For an individual country such as Brazil in particular, it can be only a temporary palliative measure capable of providing a respite. However, this path does not remove the burden of a solution to the crisis from the shoulders of the people. Consequently, it only opens the valve, releasing steam from the kettle which is threatening to explode, but it does not solve the problem of "steam formation."



The recent decision on a temporary moratorium on loan payments speaks of the fact that the country's governing circles are capable of responding harshly to the harsh language of "centers."

Thus, Brazil occupies a special place in the modern world in terms of many special characteristics of political and economic development. We are not speaking of some sort of exclusivity because the laws of social development are universal. We are speaking about the specific conditions under which the Brazilian people do a great deal for the sake of the future, for the sake of enabling the children and grandchildren of today's Brazilian population to step into the third millenium with great optimism and to prepare their magnificent and for many, still enigmatic, country for the start of a new society.

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BRAZIL'S PRESIDENT SARNEY INTERVIEWED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 4, Apr 87 pp 14-18

[Interview with Jose Sarney, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil: "Peace and Cooperation—The Main Tasks of Our Time"]

[Text] In the course of preparing this special issue the editors, with the help of the Brazilian ambassador to the USSR, Ronaldo Moty Sardenberg, turned to the country's president, Jose Sarney, with a number of questions which he graciously agreed to answer.

[Question] What tendencies in particular in the sphere of disarmament and the struggle against a nuclear catastrophe must prevail, in your opinion, in international relations until the end of the century?

[Answer] Peace, disarmament, the struggle to avoid a nuclear accident—these are the main tasks of our times. Their implementation requires constant attention and efforts on the part of all countries regardless of political structure and level of development. Today the strengthening of peace and international security is the condition for achieving the security of any country, strong or weak. This can be achieved only by means of joint efforts, discussions within the framework of various forums available to international associations, especially the United Nations Organization. Brazil is for peace and disarmament. It also supports negotiations and equal cooperation among states. In my opinion, international associations must follow this path in the near future.

[Question] What role can Brazil play in the near future in the world community, keeping in mind its great potential and pace of development?

[Answer] Brazil's role in the world community and in the life of the region is growing. We are striving to strengthen peace and international security; we are striving for disarmament, for dialogue and for extensive cooperation. Without any kinds of prejudices we are developing relations with all friendly governments, we are trying to understand the special characteristics of every country and we respect the right of every people for self-determination and express solidarity with the oppressed peoples of the world. I must say that step by step Brazil is strengthening its ties with its neighbors--the countries of Latin America and Africa, which are united in common historical

traditions and the striving for economic development and for providing a better life for every man, woman and child. We are sure that there is a direct relationship between the questions of peace, disarmament and development not only because genuine disarmament will free resources, the use of which could accelerate the economic growth of all countries, but also because a rapid pace of development can be achieved only under conditions of general peace. It is under such conditions that international cooperation is raised to the required level in connection with the dramatic conditions of hunger and poverty which are characteristic for a number of countries.

[Question] What kinds of problems is the "New Republic" coming across and how are they being decided?

[Answer] The "New Republic", as we know, has come across problems relating to consolidating the democratic process in the country as well as across economic difficulties related to the struggle against inflation, the foreign debt and the need for further development. To solve all of these problems a great deal was already done in 1986. The country held free elections in which 70 million voters and all political parties participated. Parties and trade unions which previously were forbidden acquired legal status. The "Kruzado plan" resulted in a significant decrease in inflation. In negotiations on the foreign debt, including with the IMF, we basically proceeded from the fact that the debt's repayment cannot be implemented by means of dislocating production, of growth in unemployment and of the impoverishment of the people. The country has entered a growth phase. In 1985-1986 economic growth equalled 20 percent. The income of hired workers has increased by 30 percent and millions of new consumers have gained access to markets of necessary goods. Thus, there is no reason for pessimism; nevertheless we have firmly decided to struggle against the problems that continue to exist.

[Question] What new phenomena characterize contact between Brazil and other Latin American countries and what are Brazil's relations to the conflicts in the region?

[Answer] First I must say that Brazil identifies fully with Latin America. Our ties with the region's countries are truly fraternal. Today we feel that we are on an equal footing with other countries in the process of regional development, which is important both in the political as well as economic spheres. There are increasing possibilities for meetings not only on the level of heads of state but on the diplomatic level as well. Today this comprises the specific foundation for the movement within the framework of the region aimed at political coordination of actions and economic integration. Brazil supports this movement and gravitates toward it, and this will become the distinctive feature of Brazilian policy during the current decade in the history of our continent. As for conflicts in the region, Brazil's attitude toward them is well-known. We have the traditional point of view about the Malvinas Islands [Falkland Islands]--the sovereignty of Argentina should be recognized. We maintained this position even at the most difficult moments. On the question of Central America, and in particular Nicaragua, we are trying to act in such a way as to achieve peaceful and coordinated solutions that will eliminate foreign intervention in the region. In this context I would like to recall Brazil's proposal at the last session of the United Nations

General Assembly concerning the creation of zones of peace and cooperation in the southern Atlantic. I emphasize that this initiative has received support not only in coastal Latin American and African countries with direct interests in this but also in the international community, including such authoritative members as the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

[Question] In your opinion, what are the prospects for the development of relations between Brazil and the USSR?

[Answer] Brazil and the Soviet Union have maintained friendly relations from the moment the "New Republic" was established. These ties have a firm foundation and promising prospects. The dialogue with the Soviet Union is an integral part of Brazil's foreign policy. Despite differences in socio-economic structure there is an area in which the government of every country can constructively use the wide range of possibilities for cooperation. Modern Brazilian-Soviet relations are being built primarily on a state, i.e. intergovernment, level and on the unshakeable principles of sovereignty, mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs and on mutual benefit and the achievement of common interests. The firm adherence by both countries to these principles as well as the readiness of both countries to support relations on the basis of their own interests compel me to look at the future of bilateral ties with optimism. For this we must utilize an extensive field of activities--continue exchanging visits of government functionaries, continue the practice of political consultations, expand trade-economic and cultural exchanges and breathe life into scientific-technical cooperation.

Many Brazilian government functionaries have recently visited the Soviet Union. Among them is Olavo Setubal, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jose Frazhelli, congress president and senator, Deni Schwartz, Minister of Housing and Urban Affairs and Renato Archer, Minister of Science and Technology. This year we expect a visit by the USSR Foreign Minister, E. A. Shevardnadze, whom I had the pleasure of meeting in 1985 during my visit to the United States. A mechanism for extensive political consultations has been instituted. Now both governments have the possibility of exchanging information on current world problems. Although Brazil and the USSR have different points of view on international questions it is essential to recognize that all countries, regardless of their socio-economic structure, are responsible today for the creation of a climate of international peace which will enable them to move the capital needed for the arms race into the achievement of the most just and noble aims of development. Last year this theme was the subject of an exchange of correspondence between myself and M. S. Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

At the same time, trade conditions between Brazil and the USSR are not dynamic enough for us to depend on. Both sides must try to increase the purchase of manufactured products from the other. At the present time there have been various types of business contacts. The basic goal of the Brazilian government is improving bilateral trade on a higher level, which will enable us to overcome the tendency to curtail goods turnover, to objectively approach the question of a balance that is advantageous to Brazil, and to supplement the nomenclature of traditional goods with high-tech goods and with goods having a high supplementary value.



I would also like to note that in the area of scientific-technical cooperation there has been progress, which heartens us. Bilateral relations in the given area are built on an equal and mutually-beneficial foundation.

Now, utilizing the conditions of the existing dialogue, the governments of both countries must make efforts to develop relations for the future.

[Question] Before you took the post of president you were well-known not only in politics but also as a writer. Do you find the time for writing now?

[Answer] I have always felt that politics was my fate whereas literature was my real calling. During my entire political life I have always found a way to combine these activities because they are in no way antagonistic. I even feel that these activities supplement each other and that my point of view is reflected deeply in my plots as well as in my characters. Naturally, the political post and the duties of president of the republic do not leave time for a type of writing that requires great outlays of emotion. This results in the fact that my attitude toward literature today has become a kind of vow which i keep delaying, a celebration of the soul, the ghost of which hovers in the air--visible but unattainable. Naturally, I sometimes take notes, recall events in my memory and have ideas, but then I force my imagination to disappear in the hope that some day a blank sheet of paper will contain them in the form of one kind of literary text or another.

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INFLUENCES ON FORMATION OF BRAZIL'S 'NEW REPUBLIC' ANALYZED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 4, Apr 87 pp 19-32

[Article by A. A. Sosnovskiy: "The 'New Republic': Problems of Democratization"]

[Excerpts] The last 2 years of civil rule in Brazil are looked upon by most of the political powers of the country as a transitional period, a time of democratic "normalization" in the country's life. Already in February 1985 the Brazilian Communist Party [BCP] noted that the victory in the electoral college on 15 January 1985 of the Democratic Union held together by a coalition and its candidates for higher state office, T. Neves and J. Sarney, opens up a new political process, the beginning of which will be the period of transition to a democratic regime. In the course of this transition we must eliminate the legacy of the dictatorship which suffered defeat and the create a foundation for a new policy in economic and social areas. Communists saw the proclamation of the new constitution by the National Constituent Assembly as the culmination of the transitional period.<sup>1</sup>

Although life has made certain corrections in the forecasts that were made--instead of the deceased T. Neves his partner in the coalition, J. Sarney, became the president of Brazil; the task of confirming the new constitution was assigned not to a special assembly convened for this purpose, but to the National Congress with the corresponding expansion of powers<sup>2</sup>--in general the development of events confirms the correctness of the judgements expressed above.

The election of delegates to the Constitutional Congress and of state governors on 15 November 1986 were the result of 2 years of civil rule. An analysis of these results will enable us to more fully bring out the deep tendencies in the process of democratization in Brazil.

On the Path to the 'New Republic'

Obviously coinciding according to many parameters with processes taking place in Argentina and Uruguay, the course of democratic transformation and the entire socio-political situation in Brazil are also clearly unique. In comparison to Brazil's neighbors, the differences found in Brazil are primarily based on qualitatively somewhat different results due to the long

period of military rule. As in other countries of the southern cone, the Brazilian military regime was politically reactionary in nature, carried out policies against the people and in this had undoubtable traits in common with the other South American dictatorships, for which it even served as a sort of "standard" for many years. The differences are rooted in something else—in Brazil the military-technocrat elite was successful in implementing that capitalist modernization which our "neighbors" were striving for (usually unsuccessfully).

An analysis of the reasons for this incomplete, relative but still effective "Brazilian model" are outside the thematic framework of the given article. We can only confirm what is evident: the dynamics of today's Brazilian capitalism is significantly greater in comparison to the situation in other countries of the region. Confirmation of this can be found easily in numerous works of an economics and social nature. In connection with this, of great interest is the opinion of the famous Argentinian sociologist, G. O'Donnel, who underscored the following in an interview in the Brazilian magazine SENHOR: "In comparison with other countries on the continent Brazil (alone) has a dynamic economy. It is a much more capitalistic country than all the others and its middle class is much more middle class and has deeper roots in the production sphere."<sup>3</sup>

The dynamism that has remained in modern capitalistic development in Brazil despite the strong negative effects of factors common to all of Latin America such as economic and technological dependence on the United States, the foreign debt, and trade protectionism on the part of developed capitalist countries, has put an imprint both on political life as well as on the entire sphere of public consciousness, on the characteristics and pace of the transition from military dictatorship to civil middle class-democratic leadership of the "New Republic."

The course of "liberalization" was oriented towards decreasing dissatisfaction, towards "releasing steam from the kettle," towards deflecting the opposition's speeches and towards achieving a smooth, militarily-controlled transition to civil middle class moderate-conservative government. However, this path did not represent simply an alternative to a revolutionary solution to the crisis situation. Under the specific conditions of Brazil in the 1970's to 1980's this kind of decision was not on the agenda. It was a logical development in long-term capitalist modernization strategy—a strategy of the so-called "Casteloite" and "cosmopolitan" groups of military ideologists involved in the 1964 overturn of the government.<sup>5</sup> "Liberalization from above" was the dominant tendency in Brazil's political process in 1975-1982.

Abandoning position after position, the governing elite of the regime still clearly maintained the initiative in their hands. Beginning with the 1982 parliamentary and governors' elections in the course of tense confrontation with the retreating reactionary forces the initiative was passed to the opposition, to the supporters of more extensive democratic changes than those planned by the military. Pressure "from below" on the part of trade unions, mass public movements, the opposition block and broad strata of society began to determine the dynamics of political life to a larger and larger degree.

Nevertheless, even in 1984, when the true national scope of the campaign for direct presidential elections and the reestablishment of a democracy finally undermined the position of the regime, the "bottom groups" still did not acquire the leading role in the transformation process, and a solution to the political crisis was found through compromise--the union of traditional anti-dictatorship forces and a powerful center group which had diverged from the government camp. It was the unification of the voices of opposition and first and foremost of the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), with the voices of these new "fellow-travellers of democracy"<sup>6</sup> within the framework of the coalition of the Democratic Union that yielded the victory in the electoral college and made today's "New Republic" a reality.

Within the context of the general democratization process in the countries of the southern cone it should be noted that in Brazil as well as in Argentina and Uruguay the demand for the reestablishment of democracy had practically universal support in the early 1980's. An economic slump served as the detonator for this everywhere. But in contrast to Argentina, for example, where the catastrophic failure of the dictatorship's economic course, its defeat in the Malvinas Islands military conflict and the moral and social legacy of the "dirty war" against democratic forces resulted in an obvious and all-encompassing crash of the military government system, in Brazil the military suffered political defeat but not a crash. It retreated while maintaining a strong behind-the-scenes influence on political life. As emphasized by Brazilian and foreign observers, the military has retained a type of unspoken "right to veto" decisions that displease it.<sup>8</sup>

#### First Results

The previously cited F. H. Cardozo called the government created by T. Neves and only slightly altered by his successor the "bridge between the authoritative past and the democratic future,"<sup>9</sup> thereby also emphasizing its intermediate, transitional nature. After fairly significant changes in February 1986 the cabinet of President J. Sarney basically reflects this analysis. The cabinet consists of representatives of central and moderate-conservative policies related to the FL (Liberal Front Party) and a number of ministers are well-known activists in the basic power structure of the Democratic Union-PMDB. The variety in the composition of the cabinet is also manifested in the fact that it includes political figures noted for their loyalty to the former regime as well as recent radical opposition figures, including those who are close to trade unions and to leftist circles.

The government program announced in January 1985 (its name, the "New Republic," was carried over to the entire present stage of Brazil's political development) retained most of the resolutions and demands of the Democratic Union's pre-election platform. In both documents absolute priority was given to dealing with the most acute economic problems--inflation, unemployment and the foreign debt. Especially emphasized was the necessity to deal with them without continued infringement upon the interests of the "lower classes." The civil authorities attempted to achieve coordination between economic effectiveness and urgent measures to ease conditions for the more deprived strata of society by means of a "social pact"--a three-party agreement concerning cooperation between the government, owners of businesses and trade



unions. This plan was suggested by an old tradition in Brazilian political life that to a certain degree has retained its vitality to this day--the tradition of corporativism, and the direct model for this was the "Monkloa pact" (1977). Further democratization of the country's political life is planned--the elimination of the legacy of repressive laws from the previous regime, removal of remaining limitations on political activity, restoration of direct elections for local authorities on the level of municipalities of large cities and in so-called "national security zones," elections to the constituent assembly, the acceptance of the new constitution and at the conclusion of this process--the election of a new president in direct elections.

The practical activity of J. Sarney and his closest circle during the last 2 years has generally confirmed the seriousness of his intentions to follow the course that was declared in the program documents of the government coalition. This earned the president a high level of authority among the population--in 1985-1986 on the average no fewer than two-thirds of those surveyed supported his political course. The civil government put into action an extraordinary program to fight hunger, to improve the system of public health, to develop new jobs, to curtail the growth of crime and to develop distant regions. In 1985-1986, despite economic difficulties, 10.5 percent of the GDP was allocated for these purposes. The most important step of the new government as far as consequences are concerned was the economic reform (or "Kruzado plan") promulgated on 28 February 1986. Without analyzing it in detail,<sup>10</sup> let us simply note that at the first stage of reform (up to November 1986) we were able to achieve a sharp decrease in the inflation rate without any considerable reduction in economic growth. The purchasing power of significant groups of the population, and above all of many categories of workers, has increased. And although today the negative aspects of the "Kruzado plan" are apparent (especially after the implementation in November 1986 of the new package of economic measures, the so-called "Kruzado-2"), its implementation resulted in increased government authority and clearly was to the advantage of MPDB and FL candidates during the last election campaign. In 1985-1986 economic growth surpassed 8 percent and the number of jobs increased by 1.9 million in the course of the 1.5 years of civil government. These real achievements brought corresponding political "dividends" to the government.

In the legal sphere we should single out steps such as giving the right to vote to the illiterate (over 20 million people), eliminating practically all limitations on the activities of the BKP [Communist Party of Brazil] and other leftist parties, reestablishing direct elections at all levels and passing fairly radical laws about the protection of the democratic state.

While criticizing some aspects of J. Sarney's policies, leftist forces, including the BKP, have generally supported them. A statement by the BKP Central Committee on 29 September 1985 emphasized: "It is important that democratic forces...give decisive support in the institutional plan to the government's implementation of its plans. The strongest the unity and mobilization of the masses, the more these plans will meet the needs of the people."<sup>11</sup>

It should be noted that leftist parties meet with considerable difficulties. The effect of anti-communist propaganda, the tradition of corporativism and paternalism as well as the weakness and dispersion of the leftist organizations themselves, which continue to disagree amongst themselves, still do not enable these parties to influence general political life forcefully enough. Despite the indisputable successes of leftist forces in recent years—expansion of their mass base, strengthening of their position within the trade union movement and a fairly successful solution to previously-existing problems in the BKP underground involving the transition to legal and parliamentary activities—bourgeois and petty bourgeois parties still have the dominant influence on Brazil's political development--too varied in composition are the left of center block of the PMDB; the right of center FL; and the national-reform, Democratic Workers Party (PDT) of Leonel Brizola with its strong association with the social-democratic ideas.

However, in today's Brazil it is rare to find a political party or group that comes forward with a sincerely true slogan--the memory of the period of dictatorship is too fresh, and reactionary currents continue to exert leverage over the country's development. Many factors attest to the continuing danger of "recoiling" back and about the strength of reactionary and conservative tendencies. A visible manifestation of the embittered resistance of reactionaries even to transformations occurring long ago and implemented under an externally fairly "smooth" continuation of Brazilian political life is the situation surrounding the government's plan for agricultural reform.

Despite the apparent necessity of agricultural reform, a powerful lobby of latifundista [large landowners in South America] is mounting strong opposition to any practical steps to redistribute land. The reactionary association of landowners, the Agrarian Democratic Union (UDR), which was created in 1985 and has gathered strength rapidly utilizing its extensive financial means, is not only impeding the implementation of reforms in any way possible through its agents in the National Congress and higher bureaucratic echelons but is also openly creating militarized formations to protect its own members and is sabotaging the purchase of agricultural products. Under pressure from conservative forces the implementation of agrarian reform for all intents and purposes has been "frozen."<sup>12</sup>

Another example of the different tendencies existing in Brazilian political life is the results of municipal elections in November 1985. Voting took place in the capitals of states, federal territories and 176 municipalities which were previously considered to be "national security zones" in connection with which their authorities were appointed by the federal government. The results were viewed in political circles as a "rehearsal" for the parliamentary and governors' elections in 1986. Although the PMDB was victorious in over 100 municipalities, a tendency that was alarming to the democratic forces made itself known. A serious blow to the supporters of transformation was the election of the former president, J. Quadros, as prefect of Sao Paulo, the largest center of both economic and political life in Brazil. Unified behind him were not only mixed reactionary groups but also local organization belonging to the FL government coalition. The unexpected voting results in Sao Paulo not only contributed to reviving rightists but also once again brought out the internal heterogeneity of the Democratic Union

and the continuing possibility that its unity may be undermined. The voting results also attested to the fact that the seemingly antiquated arsenal of populist methods of social demagoguery still retain their vitality.

### Difficulties and Prospects

The 1986 elections brought the first period in the history of the "New Republic" closer to completion. Their results were an important step on the path towards strengthening political democracy in Brazil. But, as was justifiably underscored by the BKP in its programme document, "The Democratic Alternative to the Crisis in Brazil," the path of the revolutionary transformation of society not only "puts the struggle for victory and for the constant expansion of democracy into a central position in the activities of communists and the working class" but also requires "socio-economic transformations that are necessary for victory, consolidation and movement forward."<sup>15</sup>

To what extent is the current democratization being put within the framework of the dictatorship-democracy "pendulum", which has been traditional for Brazil during the current century (especially after 1930)? Or, on the contrary, to what degree does it extend outside the limits of this scheme? These are questions that can be answered only after we evaluate the depth of the changes that have occurred and are occurring within the social structure and political system of Brazilian society. Above all, of great significance for the fate of democracy in the country is the acute lack of correspondence between the dynamism of economic life and the stagnation and archaic nature of social relations which have been carried over from the past. President J. Sarney has admitted, in particular, that while Brazil, which occupies half of the entire area of South America, is today one of the 10 largest countries in the world in terms of volume of economic production, it belongs to the poorest as far as social indicators are concerned.<sup>16</sup>

The glaring contrasts, long commonplace in magazine descriptions, between the level and style of life not only of the very "elite" but also of the entire "modern sector" of Brazilian society and the great masses which live under conditions of poverty and a traditional patriarchal structure, continue to "hold back" the political system as a whole. But even within the framework of the "modern sector," where during the last decade there have been serious changes in social and class structure, "it is surprising how it was possible to make do with such a small degree of social freedom and guarantees which are considered to be self-evident in any capitalist society and achievable at the middle level of development."<sup>17</sup>

The situation is made more serious by the presence of an enormous reserve army of manpower, many millions of people who for all practical purposes have not been touched by capitalist modernization. Their presence gives the ruling classes the opportunity to continue their policy of "economic development without (or practically without) growth in well-being." The existing situation is fairly accurately characterized by the term "Belindiya" coined by the well-known economist Zh. Basha, who feels that a relatively small "island" of modern capitalism ("Belgiya") in Brazil is still surrounded by a "sea" of traditional structures.



The practical experience of the "New Republic" during the last 2 years, like the history of its development itself, have shown than in contrast to the changes that have occurred during the last two decades in the economy and in social structure, in political life the characteristics which determined its development in the 1930's-1960's have remained largely unchanged. Despite the high level of political mobilization of society as a whole, policies are to a large degree "established" on the level of the elite of the largest parties, on a personal basis. As before, "Kaudilo" preserves its clientele relationship with functionaries and the party apparatus--this is characteristic not only for the heirs of a traditional populist trend such as trabalismo [Translation unknown]--the PTB [Brazilian Labor Party] and PDT [Democratic Workers Party] but also for other party formations.

The majority of functioning parties (we are speaking of the largest, most stable of these, not about the one-day parties which are created and disappear) are extremely vague on the ideological plane. They are either broad poly-class associations of the PMDB type, or movements united around a "charismatic" leader and his ideology (PDT, PTB), or organs representing certain group or regional interests (FL, PDS [Democratic Social Party] and smaller parties operating in a number of states).

As far as BKP is concerned, we can speak about an integrated ideology only in the PT [Workers Party], but even this party is internally heterogeneous and several groups with differing ideologies are struggling within it. Evidently this cannot but finally result in the restructuring of the existing party system as it adapts greatly to the needs of the real representatives of ideological-political tendencies and class interests of modern Brazilian society. This process will have to be a painful one as a result of the hindering effect of the backward social sphere, the reactionary nature of the ruling class and some traditions of political culture.

On the path toward democratization of the internal political life of Brazil there are still many dangers. Perhaps the main one today is the unnoticed penetration of traditional, conservative elements inherited from the previous regime into all the "pores" of the newly-born democracy.

The results of the transitional period are varied and sometimes contradictory. Still, the future of the democratic structure in the country in general is cause for optimism. The dynamics of a class, political struggle shows the difficult, not always consistent but continuing expansion of "space," controlled by the forces of democracy and social progress in all areas of the life of the largest Latin American country.

#### Footnotes

1. Os comunistas e a transicao democratica. Voz de unidade. Sao Paulo, 23 Feb 1985, p 4.
2. According to a proposal made by the government of J. Sarney and confirmed by parliament, during 1987 the newly-elected members of the National Congress (the so-called Constitutional Congress) must confirm the new

Brazilian constitution and then continue to fulfill the regular function of the legislative organ.

3. SENHOR, Sao Paulo, 1986, N 284, p 6.
4. From the point of view of prospects for the stabilization of the new democracy great importance is attached to the phenomenon of the paradoxical combination of a big gap between the top and bottom of Brazilian society and the hope shared by both concerning the possibility in the near future of a better future, well-being, "a great Brazil in the 21st century", and so forth. As we know, these sentiments were widely utilized by the populist governments of Vargas and Kubitschek, then by the military during the period of the "Brazilian miracle," and today they are again becoming a part of the arsenal of means to influence the masses. Of interest are the recent attempts by Latin American sociologists to juxtapose the social expectations of a significant portion of the populations of neighboring countries that "look to the past" with the "historical optimism" of Brazilians.
5. "Casteloites" were named after the first military president, U. Castelo Branco (1964-1967), who expressed several ideas that preceded "liberalization."
6. In December 1984 the group under discussion became the Liberal Front Party (FL [PFL]) .
8. See, for example: INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Paris, 25-26 January 1986, p 1, 5.
9. F. H. Cardozo. Op cit., p 5. [F. H. Cardozo. A ventura da mudanca., Folha de Sao Paulo, Folhetim especial, N 425, 10 marco 1985, p 5.
10. See article by A. P. Karavayev in the current issue (Editor's note).
11. Os comunistas, as eleicoes e a Constituinte, Voz da Unidade, 5-11 September 1985, p 10.
12. See the article by V. B. Reznikov in the current issue (Editor's note).
15. Uma alternative democratica para a crise brasileira. Sao Paulo, 1984, p 158.
16. Interview with President J. Sarney, ZA RUBEZHOM, 1986, No 47, p 15.
17. SENHOR, 1986, N 28, p 6.

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POLITICAL, ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF U.S.-BRAZIL RELATIONS REVIEWED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 4, Apr 87 pp 95-102

[Article by N. M. Isakova: "Conflicts with the United States Grow More Acute"]

[Text] Relations between the largest country in Latin America and the United States reflect the basic tendencies in relations between developed and developing countries. At the same time, the characteristics of socio-economic and political development in Brazil and its foreign policy course have provided the background for the specific relationship. The most characteristic tendency of American-Brazilian relations, especially in the 1980's, was the weakening of a one-sided dependence by Brazil on the United States and the increase in the circle of unsolved economic problems and political disagreements.

The history of bilateral ties has suffered highs and lows and a lessening and exacerbation of conflicts. The period of closest alliance between the two countries began after the establishment, with Washington's help, of a rightist military regime. The Brazilian variant of the anti-communist concept of "national security" that was developed by ideologists of the military regime under the influence of U.S. geopolitical doctrine became the official ideological platform for the following decade. The foreign policy aspects of this concept were based on theses about Brazil's belonging to "western democracy" and on the necessity for close cooperation with the United States as the leader of the "free world." In practical terms this was manifest in the almost complete subordination of the country's diplomacy to American foreign policy. Following Washington's orders, the military regime in 1964 broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba and one year later unconditionally supported U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic.

During the next two decades the country's foreign policy course evolved considerably. The doctrines of "ideological boundaries" and "automatic unions" were replaced by the more flexible doctrine of "responsible pragmatism and non-automatic unions" of President E. Geisel, who made the first significant step on the path toward diversification in foreign policy and in international economic relations. Changes in emphasis in foreign policy appeared especially clearly in the government of J. Figueiredo (1979-1985). The ideological basis for these changes was the concept of "diplomatic

pluralism and universal foreign relations." From the second half of the 1970's, according to the opinion of American scholars, Brazil's foreign policy "depended first and foremost on the country's economic interests and was intended to facilitate the development of foreign trade and to bring closer the day when Brazil reached world status as a 'great power'."<sup>1</sup>

As a result of the changes in foreign policy concepts and practice it became possible to significantly expand trade-economic ties with Western Europe, the developing countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia and countries of socialist cooperation. By the early 1980's Brazil had diplomatic relations with over 90 countries. Its place in the international arena changed and its role in inter-American relations increased, attesting to this country's transformation into a "regional power center." The activation of Brazilian policy in various regions of the world and growth in independent actions in the international arena was facilitated to a large degree by growth in the country's economic potential and by its transition into the detachment of "new industrialized nations." These changes weakened economic and military-political dependence on the United States and enabled ruling circles to correct the foreign policy course in accordance with the goals of national development and the reality of the international situation without looking back at traditional "American-Brazilian friendship." Although the preservation of technological and currency-financial dependence by Brazil on the United States and the large role of North American TNK [Expansion unknown] in its economy limited opportunities to carry out a completely independent course in the international arena, the increase in conflicts between the two countries in the economic, military and political spheres became a constant factor in modern international relations in the Western hemisphere.

To a significant degree negative phenomena of international life such as interventionism and aggression in the foreign policy course of the Reagan administration, the ineffective struggle for NMEP [Expansion not given] and other problems affected the condition of Brazilian-American relations. On the regional level a negative role was played by the U.S. position in the English-Argentinian war of 1982 and by the exacerbation of the Central American crisis. The last two circumstances determined important changes in the social consciousness of the peoples and governments of Latin American countries, including Brazil, as regards questions of war and peace, encouraged anti-American sentiment and strengthened continental solidarity. The lack of desire of Brazil's governing circles to give up the interests of their country forced the Reagan administration to seek ways to smooth over conflicts and to "normalize" relations by using the most varied means, including visits at the highest levels, diplomatic and economic blackmail, pressure by means of special envoys, and increased severity in financial and customs policies with regard to this Latin American country.

A whole series of visits of highly-placed U.S. officials (General V. Walters in February 1981, T. Enders, Assistant to the U. S. Secretary of State in August 1981) were aimed at getting Brazil to "agree" with American policy on the Near East, South Africa and in the Caribbean.

In May 1982 after an 11-year hiatus there was a trip to the United States by a Brazilian president, who arrived in Washington at a very bad moment--at the height of the English-Argentinian conflict. On the initiative of the Brazilian side the program of the visit was reduced to a minimum but in a short period of time it became clear that there was a lack of agreement on most of the international problems being discussed. President J. Figueiredo announced that his country supported the historical rights of Argentina with regard to the Malvinas Islands [Falklands], condemned English colonialism and supported dealing with the conflict situation peacefully through the United Nations. Reagan justified U. S. support of Great Britain as an obligation to an ally. There was disagreement in the area of bilateral relations as well. Brazil's president blamed the United States and other developed countries for implementing discriminatory trade and financial policies with regard to his country. In general there was no success in compromise agreements on the problems under discussion in the course of the visit. R. Reagan tried to neutralize the negative reaction of Latin American countries, including Brazil, to Washington's support of England during the Malvinas Islands crisis. A return visit by the president of the United States took place in December 1982. The Brazilian government was offered a 3-month loan of \$1.2 billion at a high percentage rate to make fixed payments on the foreign debt.<sup>2</sup> In the course of negotiations an agreement was reached about creating five combined Brazilian-American working groups for cooperation in financial-economic, military-industrial, nuclear energy and scientific-technical areas as well as for the study of space.

Of greatest interest for the United States was the document composed by the group for military-industrial cooperation, which was named the "Protocol of Intentions," or the "Memorandum of Mutual Understanding." The document foresaw the "utilization of military-industrial potential for the development and production of military equipment for the good of both countries" and the exchange of military technology.<sup>3</sup> However, this document did not have broad practical application because the United States tried to include in it resolutions hindering Brazilian export of arms into developing countries. In other words, in exchange for selling Brazil the latest military technology and equipment, Washington demanded the establishment of control over Brazilian arms exports.<sup>4</sup>

The work of the group on financial-economic cooperation concluded without results. Serious differences of opinion were expressed as concerns trade, high duty barriers, elevated bank rates and the foreign debt. The group was able to agree on a declaration foreseeing some curtailment of U.S. protectionist policies. However, soon Washington introduced new measures which resulted in a significant curtailment of the import of Brazilian products into American markets, which basically negated all of the work of the joint group. The work of the group on scientific-technical coordination turned out to be actually paralyzed in view of the acute conflicts in the area of the manufacture of electronic computer technology, in which the Brazilian government has taken a firm position. The work of the group for cooperation in the area of nuclear energy also deepened long-standing disagreements regarding the problem under discussion.



The work of the group for cooperation in the area of studying space yielded better results--an agreement was reached on a flight (before the end of the current decade) by a Brazilian specialist on board an American spacecraft. NASA and Brazil's National Institute of Space Research are exchanging information and specialists and implementing small joint projects.

In the period after the results of the work of the joint groups were summarized (1984) the number of unsolved problems on bilateral trade and economic and financial relations increased, and in most cases possibilities for regulating them are thought to be unrealistic. Washington is no longer able to dictate its own conditions, as it did previously. The situation that has developed in the area of information can serve as a graphic example of this. The passage in October 1984 of the Brazilian law on protecting the national market in electronic computer technology,<sup>5</sup> in accordance with which the import of American microcomputers and minicomputers is forbidden and limitations are placed on the activities of foreign monopolies producing computer technology that operate in Brazil aroused great displeasure in the U.S. administration. This is understandable because the total volume of American-Brazilian transactions on the computer and computer-component market equals almost \$ 1 billion per annum.<sup>6</sup>

In May 1986 the White House informed us of its decision to take reciprocal measures directed at curtailing imports from Brazil. The administration tried to justify these actions by the fact that the United States has an enormous deficit in bilateral trade.<sup>7</sup> However, soon General V. Walters, the permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations, traveled to Brazil and communicated the possibility of cancelling trade sanctions in exchange for reinstating the military agreement between the two countries which was cancelled by Brazil in 1977.

But a compromise was not reached and R. Archer da Silva, Minister of Science and Technology, cancelled his trip to the United States. In response, Washington delayed the opening of the Brazilian consulate in an American city. Discussions on a special agreement relating to steel-industry products were also halted until the problems in the area of information can be solved. Despite this, Roberto Costa de Abreu Sodre, Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced that Brazil will unwaveringly follow its law on information.<sup>8</sup> "Economic blackmail is an integral part of the foreign policy strategy of an American administration that is intent upon establishing U.S. hegemony in the world," wrote the Brazilian newspaper JORNAL DO BRASIL on this subject.<sup>9</sup>

Nevertheless, massive pressure on Brazil did not yield results. Governing circles understand well that concessions to American monopolies in this strategically-important direction of the modern NTR [Scientific-technical revolution] will result in a qualitative increase in the dependence of the national economy on imperialistic centers for many years to come. Another group of conflicts between the two countries is related to problems of foreign trade and the foreign debt. Brazil's course towards maximal expansion of export and decreased import have enabled it to take seventh place among countries with which the United States has a negative trade balance.<sup>10</sup> In 1985 thanks to severe measures taken by Washington, the negative trade balance with Brazil decreased from \$ 5.8 billion to \$ 4.4 billion.<sup>11</sup>



The dynamics of trade-economic relations between the United States and Brazil thus demonstrate that prospects for the elimination of conflicts are not promising. The approach Brazil has taken during the last few years as concerns the problems of bilateral relations and the unwillingness to waive its own interests and to follow the United States demonstrates growing independence in its foreign policy course. Moreover, the growth of anti-American sentiment among the masses is fraught with political destabilization in the future. For this reason, the search for solutions to internal political problems is being carried out by governing classes at the same time as efforts are being made to strengthen nationalistic tendencies in foreign policy.

On the other hand, as correctly noted by Brazilian political analyst Selso Lafer, "the relative curtailment in the 1970's of cooperation between the United States and Brazil (volume of investments and trade) and growth in economic cooperation between Brazil and Western Europe, Japan and the developing countries resulted in a weakening of mutual economic ties between the two countries." For this reason, emphasizes the author, despite growth in investments and trade in the 1980's, Brazilian interest already cannot be reduced to bilateral cooperation with the United States; these interests simply pass through the United States within the plane of solving important problems such as the functioning of the financial system and international trade.<sup>12</sup> In other words, ties of both countries in the 1980's are complicated by the presence of problems which it is impossible to solve on a bilateral basis.

A new stage in American-Brazilian relations is related to the coming to power of a civil government in April 1985. In essence a serious reevaluation in foreign policy thought and practice began; the process of democratization touched all the international ties of the country. Brazil officially proclaimed the course to support principles of international rights such as non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, respect for the rights of peoples for self-determination and refusal to use force in international relations. These great changes in foreign policy exacerbated American-Brazilian conflicts.

In September 1986 the head of the civil government, President J. Sarney, visited the United States. Negotiations in Washington not only did not decrease the keenness of trade-economic problems but actually demonstrated the growing striving of Brazil to protect its interests. In the course of the visit the diametric opposition of approaches to the most urgent problems of inter-American relations and to global problems became evident.

A serious area of conflict is related to the crisis in Central America. The mission of P. Habib, White House representative, J. Whitehead, Deputy State Secretary of the United States and V. Walters, permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations, in April-May 1986 was not successful in altering Brazil's policies on this question. The civil authorities, in contrast to military, have taken a firmer position, moving from rhetorical pronouncements in support of the efforts of the Contadora toward active participation in "group support."

The threat of a third world war, Washington's aggressive course to accelerate the arms race, and the efforts of imperialism to militarize the South Atlantic and to build new military bases and projects close to the Latin American continent have roused the new government to come forward with a number of proclamations and initiatives on a key current question--decreasing international tensions. Brazil spoke at the United Nations with a proposal to declare the South Atlantic as a nuclear-free zone. This region is traditionally important to Brazil. However, whereas the military regime viewed the South Atlantic from the point of view of the geopolitical interests of its country (creating a dependable system of defense against the "communist threat" and implementation of "monopoly domination" in this region), the civil government is more concerned with preserving peace in this part of the world. As President J. Sarney has announced, "Brazil will make every effort to preserve the South Atlantic as a peaceful region, free from the arms race, the presence of nuclear weapons and any confrontation with its source in other regions."<sup>13</sup>

This proposal becomes especially important under conditions of exacerbation of the international situation and the lack of acceptance by the White House of the very idea of creating nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. In essence the new initiative signified the final rejection of the rebirth of the idea of SATO [South Atlantic Treaty Organization], which aroused great dissatisfaction in Washington. Brazil also turned down a U.S. offer of \$ 300 million to reequip the Trindadi Islands in the Southern Atlantic into a supply base with the latest military equipment.<sup>14</sup> Important proof of the peaceful orientation of J. Sarney's government is the agreement with Argentina signed in November 1985 concerning cooperation in the area of utilizing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Brazil's support of Soviet peace initiatives directed at radically improving international relations have also brought about a negative reaction from the White House. From the platform of the 40th Session of the UN General Assembly Brazil's new leader called for rejection of America's "Star Wars" program. The exchange of messages in June 1986 between M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and President J. Sarney on questions of total elimination of nuclear arms, stopping the spread of nuclear armament into space brought out the closeness of the positions of the USSR and Brazil on these important contemporary problems.<sup>15</sup>

Contrary to the U.S. position, the civil government has condemned colonialism, racism and apartheid, the aggressive actions of the UAR [Republic of South Africa] against Angola and Mozambique and supports independence for Namibia. Ignoring Washington's displeasure, Brazil has organized extensive trade relations with Arab states and has concluded extensive agreements with Iraq and Libya. The restoration in June 1986 of diplomatic relations with Cuba, which had been broken after the 1964 revolution, was a clear manifestation of Brazil's independence in foreign policy activities.

In general, American-Brazilian relations are characterized by duplicity. As noted by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, O. Setubal, these relations are "not good enough to return to an 'automatic union', but not bad enough to

initiate a total break. And this is a long-term situation."<sup>16</sup> Evidently the United States has little chance of diverting Brazil from its chosen foreign-policy course. The degree of Brazil's autonomy depends on the complex interweaving of domestic and foreign factors. But Brazil's structural dependence on imperialism, its integration in the world's capitalist system and the acuteness of its economic and financial problems must be taken into account.

Nevertheless, the relations between the two largest countries of the Western hemisphere have changed during the last decade and the forms of dependence have also changed. By the mid-1980's Brazil's role in the system of international relations and its influence in the developing world had increased noticeably. All of this compels Washington to seek new approaches in the dialogue with the largest state on the Latin American continent.

#### Footnotes

1. U. S. Influence in Latin America in the 1980's. New York, 1982, p 71.
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5. Brazilian Index, Rio de Janeiro, 1984, no 85, p 8.
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7. SOUTH, London, 1986, no 64, p 36.
8. JORNAL DO BRASIL, Rio de Janeiro, 27 May 86.
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12. C. Lafer, O Brasil e a crise mundial, Paz, poder e politica externa. Sao Paulo, 1984, p 131.
13. O ESTADO DO SAO PAULO, 28 Sep 85.
14. Brasil. Respectivas internacionais. Rio de Janeiro, 1984, no 4, p 8.

15. PRAVDA, 28 Jun 86.

16. O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, 12 Mar 85.

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## BACKGROUND, STRAINS IN BRAZIL-EEC ECONOMIC TIES EXAMINED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 4, Apr 87 pp 103-111

[Article by V. M. Kulistikov: "Symptoms of Transatlantic Discord"]

[Excerpts] The cracks in the alliance between the United States and Brazil, consolidated after the "1964 coup," are becoming more and more noticeable. On this background the expanding ties of the South American country with the European Community (EC) [EEC, European Economic Community] appear to some Western political analysts as a "model of relations between industrially-developed and developing nations."<sup>1</sup> The "framework" agreement signed in September 1980 on trade-economic and scientific-technical cooperation brought Brazil into the ranks of a relatively small number of privileged partners of the West European group.<sup>2</sup> As declared by G. Torn, the former chairman of the Commission on European Communities (KES), the main value of the given agreement is that it favors the attraction of private investment from Western Europe into the Brazilian economy.<sup>3</sup> Already by early 1982 investments surpassed \$ 6 billion, and they comprised 30.5 percent of the total volume of foreign capital investment. North American TNK [expansion not given] were pushed to second place in priority.<sup>4</sup>

The counter-moves of Brazil and the EEC look like a repetition of a subject from the recent past, when Washington's displeasure pushed Brazil's governing circles into seeking "senior partners" on the other side of the Atlantic. But that is just a superficial similarity. Brazil is changing, its foreign policy is not standing in place and the Western European factor is playing a different role.

## Selected Dependence

"The Revolution of 1930"--a turning point in the history of Brazil's foreign policy--is sometimes interpreted by historians as a transition organized by the CIA with the goal of ending over a century of English influence on local affairs.<sup>5</sup> Of course the victory of "Mineyras" over pro-English "Paulists" is an important episode in inter-imperialist competition surrounding Brazil. However, we cannot forget about the fact that after Brazil gained independence the foreign influence, despite all its significance, never had a determining, decisive effect on the foreign and domestic policy of the country's governing circles. The dependent nature of this policy was manifested not in the

undistorted fulfillment of London's or Washington's directives but in the fact that the Brazilian political elite did not know how to solve administrative problems or how to capture and retain power, and could not participate independently in regional affairs without the support of one or another imperialist plunderer. Here they were up to independently selecting a "senior partner" as well as the form and degree of his participation in Brazilian affairs.<sup>6</sup>

Darsi Ribeiro explains this primordial dependence of the ruling class of Latin America by the cultural attraction of the West, first through Spanish or Portuguese influence, later—English and French, and today—American.<sup>7</sup> From these positions the course taken in the 1970's for rapprochement with the EEC can be seen as a return to the old cultural tradition—after all the group includes countries the cultures of which played an enormous role in the formation of the world outlook of Brazil's elite—Great Britain, France, the FRG (since January 1986) and Portugal. However, in our opinion the selection of a foreign policy orientation was and is dictated first and foremost by political concepts of the peripheral elite.

During the epoch of empire and in the years of the "old republic" (1889-1930) Great Britain, France and Germany played on the hegemony of Brazil's governing circles, fanning hatred of Argentina, the leaders of which also dreamed of a leading role in South America.<sup>10</sup> For their part, Brazilians utilized the conflicts between imperialist countries, which provided many opportunities for maneuvering.

Under the influence of these circumstances a new form of partnership has developed between the Brazilian leadership and Western Europe. First of all, the Brazilian leadership saw a counterbalance to the United States in the Western European factor, as reflected in the indisputable economic power and growing political independence of the EEC. Secondly, others have stopped approaching the Transatlantic partner as an imperialist plunderer which must subordinate itself on tactical grounds in order to counteract the more dangerous enemy of Brazilian independence. Others began to see Brazil as a true ally which had challenged the hegemonistic policies of the United States in the region.

#### Challenge Without Challenge

Why were the 1970's marked by increased attention to Brazil on the part of the EEC? It is very unlikely, in our opinion, that this can be explained exclusively by a desire to stimulate penetration into the Brazilian market by West European TNK's. The structure of relations of these groups with the developing world has not changed, and the "Latin American lobby" has not yet succeeded in dealing with the powers which insist on the advantageous development of cooperation with the countries of black Africa, the Caribbean basin and the Pacific Ocean. The activization of the EEC in the Western hemisphere was dictated by political considerations.

At the basis of these political considerations is the recognition of the crisis in U. S. hegemony in the capitalist world and the striving of the West European middle class to strengthen its position, and to increase its

influence on Latin America after having taken upon itself a greater share of responsibility for the situation in that part of the world which is oriented toward the West.

In connection with this, the pronouncements of a high official of the West German MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] concerning the policy goals of his country in Latin America are very curious. In his opinion, this policy should be implemented with extreme caution in order not to damage relations between the FRG and the United States, which are of priority importance. The presence of West Germany should be strengthened only in those Latin American countries where Washington's influence has decreased. The goal is to prevent these countries from leaving the pro-West orbit.<sup>17</sup> Thus West Germany's readiness to meet several of the desires of Brazil's ruling circles halfway is not a challenge to the United States but only an attempt to correct certain mistakes arising from the inflexible, in the opinion of West Europeans, position of Washington.

Thus we have the same positions, the compliance--but not for everyone or in everything. The leaders of the EEC never exhibit this if the considerable interests of Western European capital are involved. Their protectionist policies have inflicted tangible blows to Brazil's economy more than once in recent years, and they remain deaf to calls for help with the foreign debt.<sup>18</sup>

In general the EEC has developed a certain standard of an "ideal partner" from among the developing countries which Brazil meets to a lesser and lesser extent. First of all, the West European group is moving toward providing special economic benefits primarily to countries that are poorly developed economically--to suppliers of raw materials and some types of agricultural products (for example, tropical crops such as coffee and cocoa). Brazil is trying not to limit its role to raw-materials appendage in the Common Market but to constantly expand export possibilities for its manufactured goods. The latter compete successfully with Western European goods in EEC markets and in third countries. For this reason, the EEC approaches the development of trade relations with Brazil with a double standard: it provides incentives for the export of raw materials and it creates barriers on the path of industrial development.<sup>19</sup> Thus, the EEC demonstrates its disinterest in the efforts of Brazil's ruling circles to eliminate industrial and technological gaps between Brazil and the West.

Secondly, the tactics of Western European groups with regard to "Third World" countries are built on the old imperialist principle of "divide and conquer." Political-level institutions which fix the division of developing countries into privileged, less privileged and not privileged partners, have been created precisely for the purpose of hindering the development in any form of a "united Southern front" that will oppose the dictates of the North. For a long time now in the course of the so-called "Euro-Latin American dialogue" the EEC has been following a policy to undermine regional cohesiveness, stubbornly refusing to sign an inter-regional agreement with LAEC [Latin American Economic Commission] or with any other general regional integration organization. At the same time it persistently inculcates the idea in Latin Americans that by abstaining from joint action they will be able to obtain more concessions from Brussels.<sup>20</sup>

In connection with this, Brazil's activeness in developing integrated ties with Argentina and other South American neighbors cannot but arouse concern on the other side of the Atlantic. After all, the development by the region's largest countries of joint strategies with regard to the North will bring serious losses to the uncontrolled operations of Western Europe's TNK's in the local market as concerns several goods and services, and will decrease opportunities for the EEC to institute repressive measures with regard to "obstinate" participants in "Euro-Latin American dialogue."

In other words, the economic strategy and tactics of the EEC in Latin America, which has infringed upon Brazilian interests more than once, cannot be viewed as an "alternative" for the long-term. Just like U. S. strategic policy, it contains elements of dictating and pressure that reflect the egotistical interests of the TNK. This is why in conflicts between North and South on questions involving the foreign debt and economic and financial aid Brazil comes forward more and more often on the side of developing countries which are opposed by Washington and Brussels.

In recent years the growing burden of political divergence has been added to the economic problems that complicate relations between Brazil and the EEC. Brazil's activeness in solving regional and international problems, which increased sharply after the establishment in the country of civil government, usually does not meet with understanding in Western European capitals. Discord exists on important questions related to the world situation, such as the situation in the YuAR and the problem of demilitarizing the Southern Atlantic where the main source of tension continues to be the military position of one of the leading members of the EEC--Great Britain--in the conflict with Argentina regarding the Malvinas (Falklands).<sup>21</sup> There is no doubt that with continued development of multilateral cooperation between Brazil and Latin American and African countries and if Brazil's role grows in the UN and in organizations of developing states (for example, in the movement for non-alignment), these differences will only increase. The reason for this is the automatic emulation of Washington, which the leaders of the EEC continue to follow in many international problems. Brazil, according to the capital's newspaper *KORREYO BRAZILIENSE* "long ago rejected" this course as one that "contradicts national interests."

Moreover, Brazilian and Western European interests clash more and more often in various regions of the developing world where Brazil is sending arms (for example, the Near and Middle East). The underhanded intrigues of some Western European countries around Surinam and Paraguay are also not encouraging improved understanding.

Thus, the signs of discord are evident. Because of this the counter-movement begun in the 1970's has slowed. It may seem paradoxical that the non-authoritarian regime was a more convenient partner for the "model democratic" EEC than is the ideologically-allied middle-class democracy of J. Sarney, the "New Republic." This brings the necessary clarity to the burden of tradition on the foreign-policy plans of Brazil's political elite and allows to reexamine these plans and to move beyond the narrow framework of peripheral strategies of maneuvering towards new boundaries of international cooperation.



#### Footnotes

1. Brazil in the International System: The Rise of a Middle Power. Boulder, 1981, p 181.
2. In Latin America similar EEC agreements have been concluded only with the Andes Pact nations.
3. Europe. Paris, 19 Sep 80.
4. In 1969 their share equalled 48 percent, and in 1984—only 30 percent. See: LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1984, no 11, p 63-64.
5. This position is placed into doubt by the arguments of M. Bandeyra. See: M. Bandeyra, "Proniknoveniye SShA v Braziliyu" [The Penetration of the United States into Brazil], Moscow, 1982, pp 235-264.
6. For example, Great Britain, despite its influence, was not successful in forcing the emperor's government to abolish slavery. "Although pressure from England played a certain role in forbidding the slave trade, nevertheless it was not a decisive factor. The main reason for this prohibition was the internal process of development of the Brazilian economy and the crisis within the system of slave labor."—"Ocherki istorii Brazili" [Notes on Brazilian History], Moscow, 1962, p 163.
7. D. Ribeiro. Los brasilenos. Mexico, 1975, p 162.
10. Bolivar wrote as long ago as 1826 about the fact that England stirred Brazil against Argentina. S. Bolivar. Obras, vol I, La Habana, 1954, pp 1320-1322.
16. Many Western political analysts share this point of view about the EEC's Latin American strategy. See: The European Challenge: Europe's New Role in Latin America. London, 1982.
17. Europa-Archiv, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1982, no 1, pp 151, 153.
18. According to a LAES report, in 1985 the EEC introduced limits on imports from Latin American countries seven times, including from Brazil, which as a result was forced to curtail its export of steel pipes to the Common Market by one-fourth as compared to 1984. JORNAL DO BRASIL wrote about the harsh position of the FRG, like that of the United States, as regards the problem of the foreign debt.
19. A characteristic example: While curtailing quotas for manufactured goods from the Brazilian steel industry and making their delivery conditional upon the "antidumping law," the EEC at the same time provides incentives for the import of iron ore from Brazil. A total of nine types of Brazilian products have been included on the list of competitive products. The system of preferential treatment does not extend to them and when they are imported into the EEC they are subject to high tariffs.

20. COMMENTARY. New York, 1982, no 6, pp 630-632.

21. The Brazilian public was angered by Great Britain's position on the question of creating a "peace zone" in the Southern Atlantic. While supporting a corresponding Brazilian initiative in the UN in November 1986, London instituted a 150-mile restricted zone around the Malvinas the very next day, showing that there could be no talk of a peaceful solution to the disagreement.

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## JAPANESE INVESTMENT, TRADE WITH BRAZIL ASSESSED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 4, Apr 87 pp 111-120

[Article by N. I. Lutsenko: "Dialogue With Japan"]

[Excerpts] In the context of Japanese expansion into Latin American, relations with Brazil have always occupied a special place. This is not only because the most developed country in Asia sought the largest Latin American state, the most resource-rich and most promising trade partner in the other hemisphere across the vast Pacific Ocean. Long before there was any significant trade between Japan and Brazil the latter had become a "promised land" for many tens of thousands of Japanese resettlers, the "waves" of whom moved onto the Brazilian shore one after another. In "Portuguese" America, in contrast to "Spanish," and more so in contrast to the United States, a much better reception awaited Japanese emigres—under conditions of a comparatively sparse population in Brazil, where there was an acute shortage of labor, Asian resettlers were not viewed as cheap competitors and did not experience the debasement and discrimination which Japanese immigrants were usually faced with in other Latin American countries.

The Japanese community in Brazil grew to become the largest in South America. This could not but be reflected in the geopolitical conceptions of the Japanese ruling elite of the pre-war period, who thought in the categories of military adventure and forced seizure. Brazil began to be regarded as a natural promising base in the case of a possible debarkation of Japanese troops on the American continent. Of course, the specific plans (if the war in the Pacific were proceeding favorably for Tokyo) for using Japanese colonists in Brazil, who stubbornly refused to assimilate with the local population, are unknown and remain in the realm of more or less authentic guesses. But the fact that today about 1 million Japanese immigrants and their progeny live in Brazil alone has prompted many people to speak of the "unnoticed" conquest of Latin America by the Japanese.

The purposeful penetration of Japanese citizens abroad has a long history and is very practical. Evidently, it would not be a mistake to affirm that in Japan the sending of resettlers to other countries was always a matter of state policy and not a haphazard process. This was the first and most accessible form of expansion under condition of acute economic distress—"the export of human resources"—which was then followed by the export of capital

and technology. The next level of expansion will probably involve the export of ideas. This is why Japan will force the development of scientific branches and will lay the foundation for a transformation into an international information center.

#### Trade and Economic Expansion

The intensive penetration of Japan into Latin America, and above all into Brazil, was such a noticeable phenomenon that in the Japanese press it acquired the name of "Brazilian boom." Brazil has become second after the United States in terms of capital investments, attracting over 10 percent of Japanese investments abroad.

During the post-war period the role of Japan in the Brazilian economy has grown steadfastly; moreover, special growth was noted after the establishment of the military dictatorship in 1964 in Brazil. The supremacy of the military impressed Japanese administrative circles for two reasons: first--Japan had become accustomed to the traditional extolling of the Samurai caste; and second--Japanese monopolies became more assured regarding the fate of their economic interests in Brazil.

The achievement by Japan of its economic goals in Brazil was facilitated by the desire of the military bosses to be rid of the excessive orientation toward American capital, i.e. "to diversify dependence." The rapidly-developing Asian giant with traditional ties to Brazil through immigration and bonds of raw-materials dependence responded with readiness in the late 1960's to early 1970's to the invitation for more active economic interaction after having rethought the strategy and scale of implementation of its long-term interests in Latin America. Here is what the American newspaper, THE NEW YORK TIMES, wrote with open concern in 1971 about the beginning of Japanese expansion: "Trade between Japan and Latin America from Cuba to Brazil has been growing steadily since 1967. Last year it was valued at \$ 2.5 billion, or almost 7 percent of total Japanese foreign trade. Nevertheless, Latin America is acquiring more and more significance for Japan as a place for direct investment, especially in 1969, when economic growth in Japan itself resulted in a sharp jump in capital investment abroad. In March 1969, according to the calculations of the Japanese government, capital investment in Latin America equalled \$ 420 million--21 percent of all Japanese investment abroad. Half of this sum goes to Brazil, and one of the signs of steady growth of Japanese investment is the fact that direct capital investment in Brazil increased from \$ 213 million in 1969 to \$ 360.6 million in 1970."<sup>5</sup>

Similar alarm with regard to the headlong growth of the pace of Japanese expansion started to be expressed by Europeans. The West German magazine DER SPIEGEL in 1972 wrote that "the Japanese will imperceptibly win Latin America--their capital investment on this continent already surpasses the capital investment of the Federative Republic...Japanese capital investment in Latin America jumped from \$ 62 million in 1960 to \$ 699 million in March 1972. In recent months, then, it has surpassed English and German investment in this region, which equalled about \$ 600 million for each country...Trade between Japan and Latin America increased from \$ 615 million (1960) to \$ 2.93 billion (1971)." Further the magazine emphasizes that "the Brazilian military



government became Japan's most significant partner in Latin America. Over half of Japanese capital investment in the region--\$ 400 million--is directed into Brazil alone. The Japanese carry out the most extensive trade with Brazil--\$ 458 million in 1971."

One of the important factors of foreign economic expansion was the fact that Japanese monopolies forcefully "transferred" enterprises and entire branches into developing countries, where their production was already viewed as local and was protected by local law and received guaranteed access to the domestic market. Moreover, the flourishing of so-called "raw materials nationalism" in the "Third World" convinced Japan of the necessity to build industrial enterprises directly near natural deposits, which was economically and ecologically advantageous for Tokyo and made the exploitation of developing states even more veiled.

The tendency toward a gradual increase in Japanese exports over imports in the early 1970's resulted in the steady growth of a negative balance for Brazil. In the period 1974-1978 its total trade deficit with Japan reached \$ 2 billion. In order to eliminate this kind of situation the Brazilian government forced the export of its own industrial products, which resulted not only in an unprecedented increase in bilateral trade but also radically changed its structure, pushing traditional export nomenclature to the second priority. As Japan did in its time, Brazil established a whole series of special organs to stimulate export. The National Council on Foreign Trade and the National Investment Export Fund were created; they developed a protectionist system of export credits and currency-financial privileges. Thus, for example, those business owners who achieved a 10 percent growth in the export of their products as compared to the preceding year were permitted to import a number of articles on a duty-free basis.

By the early 1980's Brazil was able to overcome the tendency that was characteristic for Japanese trade with other countries and to achieve a constant positive balance in bilateral trade. In 1976 Japan tried to resist this development by introducing limitations on the import of Brazilian textiles and by decreasing by 10 percent the quota for the import of iron ore from Brazil. Although similar sanctions were taken in 1978 (in both cases Japan achieved an active balance) Japan was not able to return the initiative to itself. A considerable role in this change in trade relations was played by those same Japanese capital investments, as paradoxical as it may seem. Brazil is obliged for the sharp increase in its exports first and foremost to enterprises built by foreign, including Japanese, investors. At the same time Japan is covering the trade deficit with Brazil with interest by means of the participation of Japanese affiliates in the expansion of Brazilian export to other countries.

It should be noted that the oil crisis and the subsequent economic slump undermined the "investment euphoria" of Japanese monopolies. However, despite some decrease in Japanese investment in Brazil it remained fairly stable and by the late 1970's the volume of capital investment equalled \$ 2.3 billion. This tendency remained after the replacement of the military dictatorship with a civil government. Tokyo remained interested in the largest Latin American country because of Brazil's rich natural resources, its large domestic market,

and its continued plans to industrialize with the attraction of foreign capital.

Private capital investment is not limited to currency-financing activeness of Japanese imperialism in Brazil. The rich arsenal of penetration factors also includes direct government loans and so-called "official development aid," including "technical cooperation." In recent years free gifts, which Japan abundantly offers to other Latin American countries to increase its own prestige, have totally disappeared from "official development aid" to Brazil. However, a great deal of attention is given to "technical aid" (in particular, to educating Brazilian students, students in special courses that do not lead to degrees and specialists), which should create a new type of dependence--technological and psychological. As for government loans and other official investments, they are called upon to improve Brazil's infrastructure and are being directed into those areas which are not in the condition to attract private capital. In this the functions of supporting and promoting the interests of "their own" monopolies on the part of the Japanese government is more clearly manifested.

### Results of Experience

A type of "supergoal" of Japanese imperialism with regard to Brazil is the long-term strategy of "binding" itself to Brazil through various forms of dependence and the future protection of the interests of Japanese monopolies in this country. The shortest and most effective path to this can be seen in the propagandizing in every way possible of Japanese experience and the search for basic analogies between the development of the two countries. For example, the great theoretician of Japanese expansionism, S. Okita, who occupied the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs in M. Okhira's cabinet, speaking in 1973 in Rio-de-Janeiro at an international seminar on social and economic problems of Brazilian development, noted that the economies of Brazil and Japan complement each other and that regional disproportions and social inequality in the country could be decreased by combining its large labor force and rich natural resources with Japan's leading technology and financial aid. In his opinion, "mutual complementarity" can be achieved by the fact that 96 percent of Japanese exports consist of manufactured goods whereas over 70 percent of Brazil's exports are agricultural products.

In all attempts to justify an ideological foundation for "mutual benefit" and "historical expediency" of Japanese expansion in Brazil it is easy to guess the strategic goals which Japan, as one of the centers of modern imperialism, is establishing for itself with regard to developing countries. First of all, the "Brazilian model of development," which is based on the extensive attraction of foreign capital and TNK is propagandized by imperialistic ideologists as the alternative to an anti-imperialist means of developing the regions of other countries.<sup>7</sup> Secondly, Japanese governing circles are inclined to see Brazil as a base from which it is possible to extensively develop expansion not only in Latin America but in the entire zone of developing states, as well as a point from which it is possible to penetrate into U. S. and European markets. Moreover, the question of creating a kind of Japan-Brazil-Mexico "axis" is inflated. The first step in this kind of association should be the building of the so-called "Asian port" (approximate

cost of the plan--\$ 277 million, of which about \$ 100 million must be provided by Japan). According to the concept of those who created this proposal, goods from various regions of Latin America earmarked for export into the countries of East Asia should be concentrated here. This project includes the hope that Japanese products manufactured by Latin American affiliates of Japanese monopolies or in joint enterprises and masked as Latin American goods can achieve greater access to Asian markets.

With all the variety in theory and concepts<sup>8</sup> that is the ideological foundation of Japanese expansion into developing countries, and first and foremost into large and relatively highly-developed countries such as Brazil, they are united on two basic positions: protection of common strategic interests of imperialism in the developing world and concern about the priority fulfillment of tasks related to Japan's own monopolies. Discussions about the "historical commonality of fates," and "economic mutual complementarity" of Japan and Latin American countries, including the expediency of the Japan-Brazil "partnership," attests unequivocally to Japan's striving to place the economies of Latin American countries into even greater dependence on "their own monopolies." The experience of the trans-Pacific Ocean relationship between Japan and Brazil convincingly demonstrates that on the one hand, the Latin American orientation of Japanese expansion is of a long-term, strategic nature and on the other hand that it clashes with the growing opposition of rapidly-developing Brazilian capitalism.

Close contacts made by Japanese business and governing circles with Brazil during the period of the military dictatorship were subject to serious tests when power moved to a civil government. The country's new leaders began to look differently on ways to curtail inflation, to achieve an high pace of economic growth and to optimize the foreign trade and financial-investment balance. Although Brazil is simply in no condition to totally refuse foreign capital investment, the civil government's program on economic stabilization greatly narrowed the opportunities for advantageous application of capital and for parasitism on the part of TNK's, including Japanese corporations, based on the country's economic difficulties. It did not take long for the consequences to make themselves known--last year in Brazil there was an unprecedented drop in the level of foreign investment. Whereas in 1980-1982 it reached a per annum level of \$ 1.4 billion, in 1986 its volume decreased to less than \$ 100 million. Moreover, the withdrawal of foreign capital from Brazil has begun.

Japanese interests in the Brazilian economy, as we have shown above, are too important and too serious to curtail rapidly. But Tokyo has clearly taken a wait-and-see position, attentively watching to see what policies will be instituted by Brazil's civil government. The last splash in official Japanese-Brazilian contacts occurred in May 1984, when Japan was visited by President Joao Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo. He went to Tokyo primarily to reach an agreement about postponing the repayment of Brazil's debt to Japan, which comprised an imposing sum--\$ 470 million. The Brazilian side was able to achieve its goal but Japan obviously remained dissatisfied, since Prime Minister Y. Nakasone could not receive support from President J. Figueiredo with regard to Tokyo's initiative to carry out a new round of multilateral trade agreements. During the Japan-Brazil meeting full agreement was also not



reached with regard to the international situation, especially the situation in Latin America, for which the heaviest burden is the problem of the foreign debt. Since one side represented debtors and the other--creditors, it was evidently exceedingly difficult to count on mutual understanding. In order to make the visit appear successful, a bilateral agreement on scientific-technical cooperation was concluded. The Japanese-Brazilian Commission on Science and Technology that was formed as a result of this held its first meeting in September 1985, and last year its meeting was almost the only noticeable event in bilateral contacts. Foreseeing the counter-phase to the "Brazilian boom," Y. Nakasone promised J. Figueiredo Japanese "help" of 34.9 billion yen (about \$ 151 million), primarily for agricultural development. This decision was dictated, on the one hand, by the attempt to hold on to the thread of dependence on Japan by Brazil, and on the other--by concern about Japan's emigres, a large proportion of whom work in the agricultural sector. In addition, Japan sees the fertile Brazilian soil as a testing ground for experimenting with various types of technological innovations, including in the area of biotechnology. For example, the Japanese Administration of International Cooperation is working according to a plan which foresees that in 1987 peasants in the states of Bahia, Goas, Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso del Sol will give up 500,000 hectares of land, on which several thousand people (evidently Japanese resettlers) will cultivate soybeans by leading methods. Vessels which will travel continuously between the southern Atlantic port which is being built in Vitoria (state of Espirita Santo), and the island of Kyushu must transport the entire soybean harvest (over 2 million tons per annum) to Japan.

Of course Tokyo remains interested in Brazil because of Brazil's great potential. And the Brazilian civil government will evidently take Japan's potential into account in order to skilfully make use of inter-imperialist conflicts. Still there is a definite distancing, if not freezing, in Japanese-Brazilian relations. In 1987 President Sarney will visit the USSR, India and a number of leading Western European countries which are members of the EEC [European Economic Community], but Japan is not in the picture. In the brain centers of Tokyo there is still a feverish development of a new strategy with regard to the civil administration in Brazil and a scrupulous calculation of what Japan is able to offer to the Latin American "center of power" and what it has a right to expect.

#### Footnotes

5. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 21 Jun 71.
6. DER SPIEGEL, 26 Jun 72, pp 84, 86.
7. American political analyst Zb. Brzezinsky wrote that Brazil "has more chance of becoming a superpower in the future than Japan does because of its better combination of population, resources, geographic location and historical tradition." See: Zb. Brzezinski. "The International Community in the Next Two Decades".--Appendices, Commission on the Organization of the Government for Conduct of Foreign Policy, Washington, 1976, vol 1, p 4.



8. See, for example: "The Developing Economies and Japan: Lessons in Growth." Tokyo, 1980.

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## BRAZIL'S ECONOMIC, POLITICAL TIES WITH AFRICAN STATES NOTED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 4, Apr 87 pp 120-126

[Article by N. I. Denisova: "African Priorities"]

[Text] Brazil's policies in the developing world have undergone significant changes during the last quarter of a century. The government coup in 1964 interrupted the short period of "timid Tersemundi policies of Brazil."<sup>1</sup> The military rulers who imported not only capital and technology but also the doctrine of "national security" from the United States, began an expansionist course, trying to compensate for dependence on Washington by satisfying their ambitions in the developing world. The great-power pretensions of the governing elite was based on the country's economic success and on a whole complex of geopolitical and nationalistic concepts, the essence of which is reflected in the short but capacious slogan, "Brazil--A Great Power by the Beginning of the 21st Century."<sup>2</sup>

During that period Brazil's extremely idealized foreign-policy course excluded the development of equal contacts with African and Asian countries which had become free of colonial dependence. In addition, Brazil discredited itself by supporting the colonialist policies of the West in international organizations, by participating in U. S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, and by its open attempt at leadership in the developing world. Relations with Africa were exacerbated by the fact that the military regime saw Afro-Brazil cooperation primarily through a military prism and that it constantly propogandized the thesis concerning the commonality of defense interests in the southern Atlantic.

The ideological foundation for Brazil's policies with regard to African countries during this period was the concept of a Luzo-Brazilian association, which was one of the foreign-policy concepts that became part of the doctrine of "national security." In accordance with this concept government circles depended on cooperation with Portugal with the goal of penetrating into its African colonies. The Portuguese-speaking countries of Africa attracted Brazil's government circles with their military-strategic resolution and rich natural resources. It was planned to use these countries to penetrate into the entire African continent in the future. However, during the mid-1970's the idea of creating a Lusophone Africa-Brazil association in the form of a federation of Portuguese-speaking countries united through a common history,

language and culture lost its urgency as a result of the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire and became a barrier to regulating relations with the independent states of the African continent. Beginning only in the mid-1970's Brazil's governing circles began to develop an African policy as an independent direction in its foreign-policy course.

With the goal of easier access to markets and to sources of raw materials, and first and foremost to oil, Brazilian diplomats attempted to utilize the commonalities in the interests of developing countries and made a transition to support of their demands in the international arena. Governing circles replaced the thesis of "vertical mutual relations" with the concept of "horizontal economic dependence" and joined the struggle to introduce a new international economic order. Under conditions of exacerbation of conflicts with developed capitalist countries Brazil began to emphasize its membership in the developing world and its striving to strengthen "equal dialogue" with these countries.

Rejection of hegemony in the "Third World," a consideration of the reaction of world public opinion concerning its foreign policy actions, a differentiated approach to partners, a demonstration of solidarity with developing countries in international forums, support of demands to eliminate centers of colonialism and all forms of racial discrimination, and support of peaceful means of solving territorial disputes are the new characteristics of the country's foreign-policy course.

The striving for maximal diversification of foreign ties was reflected in the thesis on the necessity of the Brazilian "presence" in all regions of the world and especially in Africa. As a result of the changes in foreign policy and foreign economic strategy, Brazilian diplomacy was able to achieve great success in expanding ties with African countries. By 1982 diplomatic relations had been established with 41 (of 51) independent African states.<sup>3</sup>

In justifying their position, the proponents of the course to activate the African policy pointed to the fact that Brazil is the only country that was created on the basis of racial integration, and that immigrants from Africa are an integral part of the Brazilian nation.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, representatives of the business world have counted on the commonality of interests in the struggle to eliminate economic dependence and for more just international economic relations. They felt that the expansion of contacts with countries on the African continent would help to solve acute problems resulting from the deteriorating Brazilian economy. An important factor in the activation of "horizontal cooperation" with African states is the failure of the struggle for NMEP [not further identified] and the necessity for joint confrontation of the West's protectionist policy. The rapprochement process was accelerated by general concern about the exacerbation of international tension, the kindling of regional conflicts by imperialism, and the refusal by governing circles of developed imperialist powers to disarm in order to solve the urgent problems of developing countries.

Among the countries of tropical Africa, Brazil is giving priority attention to Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. A decade of close cooperation with Portugal has created certain difficulties in establishing ties with these

states. The more conservative group of Brazilian military was very displeased about the establishment of contact with the "Marxist" regimes of Angola and Mozambique. Especially upsetting during the period of rightist rule was the friendly assistance to Cuba by the Angolan people during the struggle against internal counterrevolution and foreign aggression. However, as a result of the reorientation of Brazil's foreign-policy course toward pragmatism, of the commonality of historical, cultural and language factors, of the consideration of economic difficulties and the needs of partners and of permanent declarations criticizing the action of the YuAR [Republic of South Africa] in Angola and Mozambique and the colonialism and racism in international organizations, Brazil was able to create a fairly firm foundation for continued cooperation. By the early 1980's Angola became the priority partner of Brazil in Africa. The volume of bilateral trade increased from \$ 4 million in 1974 to \$ 230 million in 1985.<sup>5</sup> In trade with Angola (and Mozambique) Brazil occupied second place after the USSR according to some data.<sup>6</sup>

The second important direction in African policy is the relationship with the countries of Northern and Western Africa (Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Ghana and others). Cooperation with the largest African country, Nigeria, is developing especially intensively. For the Brazilian economy Nigerian oil and the relatively capacious domestic market of this country, which is the first trade partner with Brazil on the continent (in 1984 goods turnover between the two countries reached \$ 1.6 billion),<sup>6</sup> are important. Nigeria, like Angola, was assigned the role of "testing area" for developing a model of relations with countries of the region.

Brazilian diplomacy has given a great deal of attention, especially in recent years, to Southeast Africa. By using its position in Angola and Mozambique, Brazil has tried to establish closer contact with their neighbors--Zambia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Under conditions of a crisis situation in the southern part of the continent the "front-line" states are expanding trade relations with this Latin American country, and in particular with regard to the purchase of arms.<sup>8</sup>

In order to attract African countries as trading partners, Brazil is offering them industrial products and technology while taking into consideration the natural features of Africa, and also technology for producing alternative sources of energy and for agricultural products. In addition, because both parties have a shortage of convertible currency mutually-advantageous barter agreements have been concluded. In the early 1980's five oil-producing African countries were among the 20 largest importers of Brazilian industrial products.<sup>9</sup>

The development of cooperation, which both Brazil and African states are interested in, is being hindered by a number of objective difficulties. Both parties have suffered fairly acutely from the consequences of the world economic crisis, which increased Brazil's problems and decreased the ability to pay of African countries. In view of the enormous foreign debt the problem of financing Brazilian projects in Africa is acute. Another difficulty is that since Brazil is economically more developed than its African partners Brazil can insist on conditions that are advantageous for it when concluding trade transactions. As a rule, it has an active balance in trade with Africa.



Moreover, the penetration of Brazil into Africa is being implemented under conditions of extreme competition on the part of imperialist countries, which retain a strong economic position on the "Dark Continent." Brazil's active policies in this region cause displeasure in representatives of business circles of developed powers, which charge Brazil with carrying out "export expansion" with regard to African countries.<sup>10</sup> The American magazine BUSINESS WEEK INTERNATIONAL has called Brazil "one of the most aggressive exporters in the world."<sup>11</sup>

Brazilian exports to Africa consist primarily of manufactured goods and semi-manufactured goods. The main articles are products of transportation machine building (cars, buses, trucks, tractors, locomotives), agricultural and consumer technology, electrical lighting apparatuses for tropical countries, metal structures, textiles, footwear and plastics. However, and here we have a manifestation of the structural dependence of Brazil on imperialist centers, the country exports primarily the products of TNK [not further identified] affiliates. The basic supplier of automobiles is the Brazilian affiliate of the West German TNK, Volkswagen do Brasil. The models exported by it have special features earmarked for the needs of the African market to make them competitive.

In recent years there has been significant growth in the export of engineering, administrative and consultation services as well as of technology to African countries. Under conditions of severe competition from developed capitalist countries Brazilian firms offer for implementation projects that take tropical conditions into account. Most of these are projects that develop the infrastructure,<sup>12</sup> that deal with housing construction and port structures or that involve the development and operation of mineral mines. Brazil faces financial difficulties in implementing these projects. This is why a promising form of economic cooperation is utilized--coordinated action by partners in implementing various projects. An example of such cooperation is the prospecting and appraisal of coal deposits in Mozambique with the recruitment of a third partner to finance the contract--the SIEC countries. Another example is the construction in Angola of the Kipanda GEM [Hydroelectric Station], the largest in Africa, in which Brazil is participating jointly with the USSR.

Under conditions of a food crisis a number of African countries have begun to import more Brazilian foods--meat, canned goods, coffee and grains.

The sale of arms to the "Dark Continent" is increasing more and more in scale--in 1985 sales totalled \$ 1.5 million.<sup>13</sup> The popularity of Brazilian military technology can be explained by its relative inexpensiveness, high technical indexes as well as by the fact that Brazil allows her trading partners to pass on the arms and technology to third parties.

As a result, total deliveries of Brazilian goods to Africa increased from \$ 71 million in 1971 to \$ 1.7 billion in 1981.<sup>14</sup> Whereas at the beginning of Brazil's penetration into Africa exports to Africa comprised 2.3 percent of Brazil's total exports (1971), in 1984 this figure had reached 6.4 percent.<sup>15</sup>

An active role in implementing export trade is played by the Afro-Brazilian Trade Chamber, which includes over 400 Brazilian government firms and TNK affiliates. In order to ease currency-financial and trade operations the large state bank of Brazil, Banco do Brasil, has divisions in a number of African countries. This same bank has controlling interest in the International Bank for Western Africa.

With the goal of strengthening the legal basis and stability of bilateral ties, Brazil has concluded agreements on technical, cultural and scientific cooperation with many African countries. In accordance with these agreements, joint bilateral commissions on technical cooperation are being created with Nigeria, Mali, Senegal, Angola, Gabon, Mozambique, Guinea and others.

Beginning in the early 1980's, with the growing interest of African countries in cooperation in the area of education, Brazil began to take a more active role in the professional training of Africa's national cadres. In early 1986 a special fund was created for the development of consultation services in Africa and for providing scholarships for Africans studying in Brazil.<sup>16</sup>

Developed economic ties were a solid basis for intensifying contact in the political sphere. Brazil is taking into consideration the growth in authority and the increased role of African countries in the international community and participates as an observer in the activities of the Organization for African Unity. In meetings with government officials of African countries at the highest levels and in the speeches of Brazilian leaders there is a demonstration of the commonality of positions on both sides with regard to urgent problems on the African continent, such as the elimination of apartheid systems and providing the Namibian people the right for self-determination. Brazil supports Angola in the conflict with the YuAR.<sup>17</sup>

In recent years there has been an activation of political cooperation on contemporary key problems--avoiding nuclear war, establishing the NMEP and so forth. On the initiative of Brazil's Minister of Foreign Affairs there are regular meetings with the ministers of foreign affairs of African states at the annual sessions of the UN General Assembly. In October 1986 African countries supported Brazil's important foreign policy initiative--the proposal to proclaim a zone of peace and cooperation in the Southern Atlantic.

#### Footnotes

1. *NUOVA SOCIETA*, San Jose, 1982, no 60, p 83.
2. See: "Sovremennyye ideologicheskiye techeniya v Latinskoy Amerike" [Modern Ideological Currents in Latin America], Moscow, 1983, p 131.
3. *NUOVA SOCIETA*, 1982, no 60, p 87.
4. As declared by Sergio Correa da Costa, Brazil's UN representative, Brazil is second in the world after Nigeria in population of Blacks.--Brazil in the International System: the Rise of a Middle Power. Boulder, 1981, p 208.

5. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 9 Jan 85.
6. Latin America and the Caribbean, Essex, 1983, p 26.
7. O ESTADO DO SAO PAULO, 20 May 85.
8. L'Amerique latine, Paris, 1985, no 420; Veja. Sao Paulo, 4-5 Aug 86.
9. AFRICAN BUSINESS, London, 1983, no 62, p 59.
10. L'Amerique latine, 1986, no 425, p 2.
11. BUSINESS WEEK INTERNATIONAL, New York, 1986, no 294-296, p 31.
12. Brazil has rich experience in road building in the selva [Tropical rain forest] of its own country, which is of interest to African countries with a similar landscape.
13. JORNAL DO BRASIL, Rio de Janeiro, 8 May 86.
14. O ESTADO SAO PAULO, 3 Jun 83.
15. O ESTADO SAO PAULO, 5 May 85.
16. JORNAL DO BRASIL, 10 May 86.
17. Granma. La Habana, 12 May 86.

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CREATION OF USSR-BRAZIL FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY MARKED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 4, Apr 87 p 131

[Article by Ye. I. Martynova: "Creation of the Friendship Society"]

[Text] On 3 September 1986 in the House of Friendship with Peoples of Foreign Countries there was a meeting of public representatives of the city of Moscow devoted to creating the USSR-Brazil Friendship Society. This society became the 10th collective member of the Soviet Association of Friendship and Cultural Cooperation with the Countries of Latin American (SADIKS).

Speakers at the meeting included V. V. Volskiy, president of SADIKS and director of the Institute on Latin America of the USSR AS [Academy of Sciences], Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg, the Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Brazilian ambassador to the USSR, Kustodio Gomes Sobrino, chairman of the Union of Brazilian Friendship Societies in the USSR and others who wish the new society fruitful work for the good of our peoples.

The society unifies 33 local organizations which were created in industrial and agricultural enterprises, in schools, in artists' collectives and in vuzes [higher education institutions].

Elected as president of the USSR-Brazil Friendship Society was A. N. Konovalov, director of the Scientific-Research Institute of Neurosurgery imeni N. N. Burdenko and academician of the USSR AMN [Academy of Medical Sciences] as well as 11 vice-presidents, among them astronaut A. A. Volkov, actress L. A. Chursina, A. N. Glinkin, department director of ILA [Institute of Latin American Studies] and doctor of historical sciences, and others. The society's governing body consists of 101 persons.

In accordance with the statutes that were passed, the main tasks of the USSR-Brazil Friendship Society include assistance in every way possible to develop friendship and cultural cooperation between the Soviet and Brazilian peoples, and mutual familiarization with each other's histories, cultures and modern life. The USSR-Brazil Friendship Society will strive to increase cooperation with the Union of Brazilian Friendship Societies in the USSR and with institutes and associations for friendship and cultural relations with the USSR which exist in the 15 largest cities in Brazil, and to provide them with the necessary assistance in preparing various measures devoted to the Soviet



Union and to implementing these measures in the country.

The society will organize meetings with members of Brazilian delegations who are guests of Soviet artists' and public organizations, as well as with members of Brazilian tourist groups visiting the USSR.

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U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN ASIA, PACIFIC VIEWED

PM270907 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 May 87 First Edition p 3

[A. Golts "International Remarks": "Provocation and Its Real Cause"]

[Text] It so happened that the Pentagon, the U.S. military department, again rejected statements coming from the State Department, the diplomatic department. So, Secretary of State G. Shultz maintained in his speech at Stanford University in California that the Soviet Union and its friends and allies "continue to demonstrate their readiness to aggravate the situation" in the Asian-Pacific region and that the USSR is allegedly "expanding the scale of its military operations." And literally the next day the U.S. guided missile cruiser "Arkansas" violated the USSR state border in the region of Avachinskaya Bay, once more demonstrating who in reality is trying to aggravate the situation in the Asia-Pacific region, and moreover resorting to premeditated provocative actions.

It is impossible not to recall here the Pentagon's so-called new naval strategy which has been operated by the U.S. Navy in the Pacific Ocean for less than a month. As is known, its authors consider that, as a result of "forward-based deployment," U.S. squadrons "are hemming in the Soviet Navy in internal waters." And what is more, there is the task of "penetrating Soviet territorial waters." It is appropriate to ask whether the provocative act by the "Arkansas" is the next stage in the operation of this sinister strategy?

I think that such actions were the logical continuation of the militarist pandemonium started by the Pentagon in the Pacific Ocean recently. It would seem that U.S. strategists, seriously afraid that both medium-range missiles and operational and tactical ones might be eliminated on the European continent, are attempting to increase sharply their potential in Asia. By the end of this decade, the U.S. press shows, the Pentagon intends to increase to 10 the number of Trident-system nuclear missile submarines in the Pacific Ocean. The placement of "Tomahawk" sea-based cruise missiles on ships of the 7th Fleet is in full swing. These nuclear means are being supplemented with B-52 strategic bombers deployed in Guam and with F-16 fighter-bombers in the southern part of the Korean peninsula and in Japan.

As for the U.S. military bases in South Korea, in the Philippines, and on Japanese soil, these are all elements in the infrastructure of nuclear aggression. Let us take South Korea. In addition to the thousand nuclear

combat munitions there, the Pentagon is also planning to deploy "Lance" operational and tactical missiles. The possibility of more powerful missiles emerging here as well is being examined. Depots are hastily being built to store nuclear ammunition.

In Japan, besides carriers of nuclear death, command centers are also being set up from which U.S. strategists intend to "lead" the nuclear conflict.

Large U.S. foreign bases are located on Philippine soil--the Subic Bay Naval Base and the Clark Field Air Force Base. Warships of the U.S. 7th Fleet, many of which have nuclear weapons on board, are based in Subic Bay. These weapons, as the press has reported more than once, are stored in the Philippines.

Such an increase in military preparations, and Washington's urge not only to preserve but to increase significantly its nuclear potential in Asia and the Pacific Ocean is forcing the Soviet Union to find the means to maintain the balance of forces. These were the reasons determining the reaching of a compromise in Reykjavik on 100 warheads for medium-range missiles remaining on each side.

At the same time, as M.S. Gorbachev stressed recently, the Soviet Union is ready to solve the problem of medium-range missiles on a global basis as well. For this it is essential that the United States eliminates its nuclear sources in Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, withdraws its aircraft carrier squadrons beyond agreed limits and, of course, does not have medium-range missiles on its territory.

As for the Soviet Union, as we see, a single approach both to security in Europe and in Asia is characteristic of it. Our country is conducting a consistent policy, the basis of which is the freeing of continents from nuclear weapons. If Washington's course is mentioned, then the secretary of state's words on the "dangerous expansion of military activity" in the Asian-Pacific region, as in other regions of the planet, applies precisely to its own actions.

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CSO: 1807/345

ISRAELI CP OFFICIAL URGES CONVENING OF MIDEAST CONFERENCE

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 May 87 p 7

[Article by Taufik Tubi, deputy general secretary of the Israeli Communist Party Central Committee: "The Near East: True Path to Peace"; first paragraph is source introduction]

[Text] The Soviet suggestion of convening an international peace conference on the Near East in which the parties involved in the region would participate, including Israel, the Palestinians (represented by their legal representative--the Palestinian Liberation Organization), and the Arabic countries, as well as the permanent members of the UN Security Council, is becoming all the more firmly established as a path to an equitable and lasting settlement.

This is the fortieth year since the 29 November 1947 United Nations resolution on Palestine. This resolution, having stipulated the end of the British mandate in Palestine, contained a decision on the formation of two independent states there--Arabic and Jewish, which granted the state of Israel international legality. The United Nations continues to speak in support of the historical necessity: that of implementing the legal rights of the Arabic people of Palestine and of realizing an inseparable part of the resolution, precisely, of creating an Arabic Palestinian state along with Israel, for the sake of ensuring peace in the Near East.

Israel's long occupation of Arabic territories has not forced the world to forget about the Palestinian problem and the Arabic people's fair right to self-determination, as the Israeli ruling circles and their American protectors had expected. The years of occupation and relapses into tragic wars only gave rise to a situation constantly fraught with new outbursts.

The separate Camp David agreements, concluded under U.S. patronage, did not take the most essential element--the Palestinian problem--into consideration and was therefore unable to ensure true peace. The consequence was the 1982 war in Lebanon and its poisoned fruits--Israeli occupation of new Arab lands, even greater instability, and the suffering of both Arabs and Jews.

Hence, at the end of last year an overwhelming majority of the United Nations General Assembly supported a resolution which calls for convening an



international conference on the Near East and for creating a preparatory committee in which the five permanent members of the Security Council would take part. It is noteworthy that only the United States, Israel and the Caribbean state of Antigua and Barbuda [sic] were against this important resolution. Participants at the Conference of Nonaligned Nations in Harare and at the Islamic conference in Kuwait unanimously spoke out in favor of an international conference on the Near East. Countries belonging to the "Common Market" also took the same position.

The failure of other approaches to the problem of a Near East settlement, as well as the pressure of world public opinion, led to the fact that the idea of an international conference has even obtained the support of Israel itself.

The publication of a new book by a former Israeli military intelligence leader E. Harhabi, "The Predestined Solution," had the effect of an exploding bomb. In it he appeals for the rapid withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied territories, believing that continuation of the occupation would be tantamount to "suicide." Harhabi's viewpoint was supported by another former head of military intelligence and minister, now the leader of the Strategic Research Institute at Tel Aviv University, Aharon Ya'ariv.

The Israeli Communist Party is constantly mobilizing Israeli public opinion in support of the international conference as a realistic and reliable way to exit the present threatening situation, a way to achieve an equitable and lasting peace. For a long time, only the communist party has advanced such appeals, yet now other voices are joining in.

Parliamentary factions which are not members of the Democratic Front for Peace and Equal Rights (a faction of the communist party and its allies) recently undertook a number of steps in the Knesset (Parliament). These are MAPAM (Unified Worker's Party) and the Movement for Citizen's Rights. By supporting certain members from the Labor Party, which is part of the government coalition, they tried to force the government to support the convening of an international peace conference on the Near East.

Among the realistic, thinking political activists, Ezer Weizman, minister without portfolio, is an important figure. In one of Weizman's recent speeches, according to the newspaper GAARETS, "he called upon the government to settle accounts with the Soviet Union in a peaceful process, since it is impossible to remain eternally isolated." He also declared that "we cannot ignore an international conference."

However, voices of realism do not at all signify that the alignment of forces in Israel has changed decisively in favor of peace. In the Labor Party itself, where a certain sane-mindedness is also appearing, the "hawks" dominate. Moreover, the official partnership of the "Likud" and the Labor Party in the "two-headed" government also reflects the supremacy of forces which favor annexation of Arabic territories and oppose an equitable peaceful settlement, the legal rights of the Palestinian people and recognition of the UN as a representative of the Palestinian people.

The heated dispute between Prime Minister Shamir ("Likud") and Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Peres (Labor Party) on the matter of an international conference essentially indicates only tactical divergences between them. Shamir spoke out against any form of conference, while Peres called for an international conference, which is portrayed as an "umbrella" or "passage" for direct talks with Jordan. The Prime Minister is generally against the idea of a conference itself because it would throw Israel back to its pre-June 1967 borders, yet Peres is in favor of the conference, which would help Jordan conduct direct talks with Israel on the basis of a plan for "territorial compromise," i.e., division of the occupied territories between them.

Peres' position is oriented toward emasculating the conference's real content and its ability to become a mechanism for achieving peace, toward depriving it of any sort of powers and tasks except those which will become a "shelter" for direct talks with Jordan. To this effect, Peres is speaking out against admitting the Palestinian Liberation Organization into the conference, i.e., for excluding the Palestinian side from the settlement process, although he also "generously" acknowledges the possibility of participation as part of a Jordanian delegation of "true Palestinians"--those who are convenient for the Israeli rulers.

Peres makes himself out to be "master of the house" and naively advances his own conditions for the Soviet Union's participation in the international conference, among which is the re-establishment of diplomatic relations which were broken off after the 1967 Israeli aggression. This is even before any kind of movement occurs along the path to convening an international conference.

The Soviet Union acknowledged the government of Israel immediately after its formation in accordance with the 1947 UN resolution. In distinction from the position of Peres and Shamir, far removed from politics and serving the interests of peace, many realistically-minded public figures in Israel understand that the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and the USSR is inseparably related to the true process of peaceful settlement and normalization of the Near East situation.

Hitherto, Peres and Shamir argue loudly in diverging on tactics, yet in this connection their "two-headed" government remains in the power of the consensus of the opponents of peace and continues to block the road to peace. Such is the reality of Israel's political life.

The Communist Party of Israel speaks out for joint activities in the country with all those who want real steps towards an equitable, comprehensive settlement, against the far from inviolable government "Likud" coalition--the Labor Party and its policy, and for conducting an international conference on the Near East, as the UN General Assembly had decided.

Furthermore, the forces of peace in Israel realize that in order to convene a conference with the goal of putting an end to the prolonged Near Eastern conflict, which also threatens overall security, international cooperation is necessary, particularly between the USSR and the U.S. Improvement of the

international climate on the whole, towards which numerous constructive initiatives of the USSR are directed, will undoubtedly also promote the establishment of peace in the Near East.

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CSO: 1807/310

SECOND AFGHAN RELIGIOUS ASSEMBLY EXPRESSES SUPPORT FOR REGIME

LD242251 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 24 May 87

[M. Leshchinskiy video report; from the "VREMYA" newscast]

[Text] A second all-Afghan assembly of holymen was held today in Kabul. This event has taken place in the month of the Muslim fast, Ramadan. These 30 days are special for Afghanistan, 98 percent of whose population professes Islam. The faithful are supposed to pray five times a day and they are forbidden to take food and water from sunrise to sunset. Naturally, in such conditions people cannot work at full strength and so, for the Ramadan period, the government sets a reduced working day. That is just one of many examples of the respect shown by the popular authorities to the feeling of believers and the traditions of the people.

This was spoken of with some satisfaction by the most respected religious figures who assembled in Kabul. They represent a major political force and their word is important and respected amongst the people. It is frequently a deciding factor not only on religious issues but on all aspects of life. One line from the Koran was heard from the platform many times today: the truth has come and there will be lying; lies will not return. This piece of ancient wisdom has been typical of the current crucial situation in the country which has come about as a result of the active policy of national reconciliation. The duty of true Muslims now, the holymen said is to bring the truth to people and to curse the lies of the irreconcilable enemies of their own people and their patrons in the West. Imperialism is the main enemy of Islam. This truth has been recognized through bitter experience not only by the Afghans. This was mentioned by representatives of Muslims invited to Kabul from Libya, Iraq, Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon.

Esteemed Mawlawi Zarifi was recently appointed Afghan Minister of Islamic Affairs and Endowment. He is well known in the Muslim world as a learned theologian and has already been in state service for several years in the belief that that is how he can be of greatest use to his people.

[Begin Zarifi recording, in vernacular with superimposed Russian] We appealed to all Afghans again today to peace. We were unanimous in our condemnation of



the policy of the fratricidal war which is being pursued from Pakistan under the cover of Islamic slogans by the seven counterrevolutionary leaders. We have discovered that, desiring to embellish their bandit nature, they are trying to hold some sort of elections and to set up a government. But these people represent nobody. They are accursed by all true Muslims and accursed by the people. [end recording]

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